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ABSTRACT: 
This study will use three types of multivariate regression analysis to examine the 
relationship between Grand Strategy Choice and Relative Military and Economic Power.  
Understanding the effects of the relative distribution of available means on a nation’s choice of 
grand strategy is important, because if they are significant, it may be possible to predict the 
behavior of great powers, based on an examination of their available means. 
The first model uses a logit analysis to look at the effect of a series of lagged independent 
variables on whether a great power adopts a Pro or Anti Status Quo posture. The second model 
uses a time series multivariate OLS regression model to analyze the effect of the same 
independent variables on the Risk of Major War which a great power assumes the following 
year. The third model combines the first two models by using a robust multinomial logit analysis 
to examine the effect of the lagged independent variables on the odds of a great power adopting 
each of the four overarching Grand Strategies the following year. 
Taken together the results of the three models indicate that both relative military and 
economic strength as well as structural variables (including: nation age, government type, 
primary economic system and others) were statistically significant predictors of grand strategy 
choice. However, the relationship between the variables and strategy choice is highly complex. 
For example, in the case of the United States, detailed analysis of the data demonstrates that 
internal variables work primarily to limit the acceptable strategy choices, while specific 
strategies are then chosen from the acceptable options based on a country’s strategic position at 
the time. This interaction is then further complicated during periods of great societal stress, 
during which policy may shift from the predicted approach for a period of time before snapping 
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back to the predicted approach after several years. In addition, the three statistical models also 
provide some statistical evidence in support of democratic peace theory, Jervis’ security dilemma 
(including the idea of offense - defense balance),1 as well as Organski and Kugler’s theory of 
great power conflict.2  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 Jervis, Robert. 1986. “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation.” Cooperation 
Under Anarchy. Eds. Kenneth Oye, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pg. 78 
 
2 Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition 
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Preface: 
Isaac Newton famously wrote “[i]f I have seen further it is by standing on the shoulders 
of Giants”3 and while this is true of all researchers and to some extent all research, it is 
particularly true in this case as the goal of this work is to create a more stable and sound platform 
upon the shoulders of those giants for future researchers to stand and see yet further. It should 
come as no surprise then that this work owes its existence to the hard work of many people both 
theorists and researchers from a wide variety of disciplines. There are far too many to be able to 
mention each by name. I am eternally grateful to each of them.  
However, there are a few people who have played a major role in directing and 
supporting this project who must be acknowledged. The first is my advisor, Kenneth Thomas, a 
true friend and mentor, who among a great many other things, was the one who first suggested I 
consider grand strategy as a topic for my dissertation. I would also like to thank the rest of my 
committee: David Kimball, David Robertson and Brian Fogarty for all their help not only with 
this project, but throughout my time as a graduate student, without their guidance I would never 
have made it this far. I would also like to thank both the Graduate School and the Department of 
Political Science at the University of Missouri Saint Louis for their generous financial support. 
Finally, I would like to thank my family, and in particular, my parents, for their unwavering 
support and infinite patience. 
  
                                                          
3 Newton, Isaac. (15 February 1676). Letter to Robert Hooke. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: 
In 2013 when the research for this project began, the probability of a modern great power 
conflict seemed unbelievably remote, and the United States seemed set to dominate as the 
world’s only superpower for at least another decade. However, the last few years have seen a 
dizzying array of challenges, including the Russian occupation of Crimea, the diplomatic 
struggle over the South China Sea, the fraying of the European Union and the continued spread 
of radicalism and terrorism around the world. This series of challenges is only made more 
disturbing by the increasing unwillingness by the U.S. to bear additional burdens to preserve the 
current world order and the increasing power of nationalist movements around the world. All of 
this means that it is increasingly likely that we will see a multipolar world soon, and with it will 
likely come a return of great power politics, and inevitably, great power conflict. Thus, the need 
to study and understand the way states formulate their overall strategies for dealing with one 
another is of greater importance than it has been at any time since the 1930’s. In particular, it is 
important to remember that the failure to understand and predict the strategies of other great 
powers has played a major role in the lead up to some of the most destructive conflicts humanity 
has ever seen, including, but by no means limited to World War I and World War II. 
It is to better understand what motivates a great power to choose a specific overall 
strategy (what is commonly referred to as a grand strategy) that is at the heart of this research 
project. The term grand strategy is a nebulous one with many different uses, but for the purposes 
of this paper we will be construing it to mean the way a nation uses its combined military, 
economic and political power, in both peacetime and war, to attain what B.H. Liddell Heart 
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called “a better peace.”4 Furthermore, most scholars in the field see a nation’s choice of grand 
strategy as a balancing act between a nation’s desire for security, its desire for prosperity, and the 
limited means available to secure these ends.5 In considering grand strategy, it is important to 
remember that the means which can be employed run the gamut from economic investment and 
trade, to multinational treaties, to ‘general’ (i.e. unlimited) war.  
In studying grand strategy, the emphasis has, so far, been on what factors (internal or 
external) have led to the adoption of specific grand strategies by specific administrations and 
examining whether these strategies have been successful in achieving their immediate stated 
goals, especially with respect to prosecuting a major war or staving off national decline. 
However, while a country’s grand strategy may fluctuate swiftly during these transformational 
periods, in less turbulent times a nation’s grand strategy may be relatively consistent for long 
periods of time with only minor variations in approach, and thus behave in a highly path 
dependent manner (North, 1990)6. This is because implementing grand strategy often requires 
making decisions with significant sunk costs and creating economic, political, military and social 
institutions to support the nation’s goals. To put it another way, if grand strategy is, as many 
scholars argue, a question of balancing means and ends, it should surprise no one that the means 
available to confront any specific crisis are likely to have been determined by decisions made 
long before, except in cases where a nation makes significant efforts to reorient itself.  
Determining which combination of means a country will use, and to what ends these means will 
                                                          
4 Hart, Basil Henry Liddell. 1974. Strategy, 2nd rev. ed. New York: Plume, pg. 353. 
 
5 Kennedy, Paul. 1991. Grand Strategies in War and Peace. New Haven: Yale. Pg. 2-7. 
 
6 North, Douglas C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge  
University Press. 
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be applied, is a political question of the first order. Yet it is also a choice which must respect 
significant constraints in terms of the means available at the time and may entail considerable 
sunk costs for the future, thus limiting a nation’s ability to freely choose. 
My central question is: do relative military and economic power determine strategy 
choice, and if so, how is a country’s choice of grand strategy affected by the relative distribution 
of means (military, economic, etc.) available at the time when the decision is made?  The reason 
why understanding the effects of the relative distribution of available means on a nation’s choice 
of grand strategy is so important, is that if they have a significant effect, it may be possible to 
gain insight into the behavior of a country, not only in the present but also in the future, based on 
an examination of its available means. This insight could in turn impact the way we assess 
everything from a revolutionary government’s potential to turn into a rogue state, to the policies 
we recommend to encourage a poor country’s economic development, to how likely a state is to 
respect international law and abide by treaties.  
Even more importantly, when it comes to avoiding a future great power war, a better 
understanding of the factors leading to a nation’s choice of grand strategy can help us determine 
which situations are most likely to lead to the rise of a revisionist state and how to prevent them. 
Eventually, this could allow resources and attention to be focused on those states at high risk of 
becoming a danger to other states in the international system, as well as providing the specific 
policy changes needed to redirect those states into becoming productive members of the 
international community. Furthermore, whether such a model succeeds or fails can tell us a great 
deal about the potential validity of the realist theories of grand strategy and about the importance 
of the tested factors in determining the behavior of states. This will in turn improve our 
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understanding not only of grand strategy, but of international relations in general, by exposing 
which factors underpin a country’s choice of grand strategy. 
This study used three types of multivariate regression analysis to examine the relationship 
between Grand Strategy Choice and Relative Military and Economic Power, while controlling 
for other factors. My main hypothesis (𝐻1) was that as Relative Economic Power increases, 
countries will have a higher probability of choosing Pro Status Quo strategies (Interventionism 
and Legalism). My second hypothesis (𝐻2) was that as Relative Military Power increases, 
countries are more likely to choose High Risk strategies (namely Interventionism or 
Revisionism). These hypotheses were tested not only in terms of the Accepted Risk of War and 
whether a country chooses to be Pro or Anti Status Quo, but also by examining the effects on 
each of the four primary Grand Strategies individually.  
The first model used a robust logit analysis to look at the effect of a series of lagged 
independent variables on whether a great power adopts a Pro or Anti Status Quo posture. The 
second model used a time series multivariate OLS regression model to analyze the effect of the 
same independent variables on the Risk of Major War which a great power assumes the 
following year. Finally, the third model combined the first two models by using a robust 
multinomial logit analysis to examine the effect of the lagged independent variables on the odds 
of a great power adopting each of the four overarching Grand Strategies the following year. 
Overall, if proponents of realist models of grand strategy are correct, then after 
controlling for other factors, positional variables such as: Relative Numbers of Military 
Personnel, Relative Military Spending, Relative GDP, Relative GDP per Capita and Homeland 
Vulnerability, should have a statistically and substantively significant effect on Grand Strategy 
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Choice. On the other hand, if proponents of constructivist models of Grand Strategy Choice are 
correct, then institutional and societal variables like Government Type, Economic System, 
Nation Age and Polity2 Score will be statistically and substantively significant. 
To minimize the potential complexity of the system being examined, it was decided to 
use data only from great powers and to focus exclusively on their strategy for dealing with other 
great powers. This eliminates potential multi-level issues where the strategies of lesser states 
could be influenced by the wishes of more powerful ‘patron’ states. Furthermore, the potential 
for a major war which could threaten the survival of a great power means that one would expect 
the grand strategies chosen by a great power, with respect to other such powers, to be as 
carefully thought out and rational as possible. Finally, great powers have some of the best 
developed bureaucracies and thus offer the most complete data available for the longest possible 
duration. In this study, data from all the great powers in existence from 1892 to 2012 was used 
with the exception of China since its economic and military data is too unreliable to be 
incorporated at this time. 
Analysis of the data indicates that while both structural and positional variables were 
statistically significant predictors of grand strategy choice, the relationship between the variables 
and strategy choice is highly complex. Furthermore, analysis of the data indicates that internal 
variables may work to limit the acceptable strategy choices, while specific strategies are chosen 
from the acceptable options based on a country’s strategic position at the time. This interaction 
can be further complicated during periods of great societal stress, which can result in periods 
where policy shifts from the predicted approach before snapping back to the predicted approach 
after several years. 
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 In addition, the three statistical models also have significant implications for some 
related political science theories including democratic peace theory, Jervis’ security dilemma 
including the idea of offense - defense balance, 7 Organski and Kugler’s theory of great power 
conflict, 8 and Mearsheimer’s offensive realism.9 Starting with democratic peace theory, both 
Model 2 and Model 3 provide statistically significant evidence linking democracies with greater 
odds of adopting lower risk and more pro status quo grand strategies. Moving on to Jervis’s 
concept of offense / defense balance, all three statistical models provided evidence that force 
structure, and not just size or funding, had a statistically and substantively significant impact on 
grand strategy choice. With the positive relationship between increased Military Expenditures 
per Personnel and the greater likelihood of perusing high risk and anti-status quo strategies 
indicating that the more capital intensive a military is, the greater the willingness to risk a major 
war.  In addition, Model 3 showed a significant relationship between Homeland Vulnerability 
and the odds a nation will pursue a Legalist Grand Strategy, providing some additional evidence 
for Jervis’ security dilemma. Next, Looking at Organski and Kugler’s theory of great power 
conflict, both Model 2 and Model 3 supported their conclusions, both showing a positive 
relationship between relative economic power and the pursuit of high risk grand strategies. This 
was further supported by the fact that all three models found a statistically significant negative 
relationship between a great power’s age and the odds of adopting a high risk, anti-status quo 
strategy the following year. Taken together this provides significant support for Organski and 
                                                          
7 Jervis, Robert. 1986. “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation.” Cooperation 
Under Anarchy. Eds. Kenneth Oye, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pg. 78 
 
8 Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition 
 
9Mearsheimer, John J. (2003). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. NewYork: W.W. Norton and Company. Kindle 
Edition location 177. 
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Kugler’s argument that rising powers are most likely to start a great power conflict. Finally, the 
model provides mixed results with respect to Mearshimer’s theory of offensive realism, for while 
the models did not find a clear relationship between overall relative military power and choosing 
high risk strategies (Revisionist or Interventionist), Model 2 and 3 did find a positive relationship 
between relative economic power and the likelihood of adopting a high-risk strategy the 
following year, all other factors being equal. 
This will all be covered in greater detail in the following chapters, beginning with a 
review of the current state of the literature in Chapter 2, from its beginnings following World 
War II to the present day, along with a discussion of the current divide between realist and 
constructivist theories of grand strategy choice. Next, Chapter 3 will discuss the research 
methodology adopted by this study including the main hypothesis to be tested, the meaning and 
construction of the dependent and independent variables to be tested and the techniques which 
will be used to test the two hypotheses. This will be followed by a more detailed discussion of 
the data, its sources and organization in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 will give the statistically significant 
results of the three models in table form as well as some discussion of the statistically significant 
results to provide some context. Chapter 6 will then take Model 3’s predictions for the United 
States and compare them to a timeline of important U.S. foreign policy events, showing how the 
complex results of model 3 work together in a real world historical example. Chapter 7 will show 
the Model 3 predictions for the remaining great powers in the study, along with some brief 
analysis. Finally, Chapter 8 will discuss the overall results of the three models with respect to the 
two hypotheses, as well the implications for some related theories and future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Literature Review 
 
This chapter will discuss the current state of the grand strategy literature from its 
beginnings following World War II to the present day with an examination of the current divide 
between realist and constructivist theories of grand strategy choice. It will also examine some of 
the many contributions made to the field of grand strategy research from other areas of political 
science research. Finally, it will conclude with a discussion of some of the ways quantitative 
analysis techniques have been used to examine questions in areas closely related to grand 
strategy choice and for which the models presented in this paper may help shed some additional 
light. 
The field of grand strategy is a highly fractured one, almost entirely lacking in formalized 
models, and even common definitions. Historically, while some scholars of grand strategy trace 
the origins of their field to Clausewitz’s On War, others, including Paul Kennedy (1991) and 
Williamson Murry (2011), see Clausewitz as being too focused on the battlefield, and instead 
argue that the modern study of grand strategy begins with works like Edward Mead Earle’s 
Makers of Modern Strategy (1943) and Basil Liddell Hart’s Strategy (1974).10 Earle’s 1943 
collection, Makers of Modern Strategy, is important because, according to Paul Kennedy (1991), 
Earle was the first to expand the definition of grand strategy to include all of a nation’s 
resources, in peacetime as well as in wartime.11 Earle’s view of grand strategy can be most 
clearly seen in his introduction to Makers of Modern Strategy, in which he wrote:  
                                                          
10 See: Kennedy, Paul. 1991. Grand Strategies in War and Peace. New Haven: Yale. p. 1-4. and:  
Murry, Williamson, Richard Hart Sinnreich, and James Lacy. 2011. The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy 
and, War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 5-7 
 
11 Kennedy, Paul. 1991. Grand Strategies in War and Peace. New Haven: Yale. p.2 
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In the present-day world, then, strategy is the art of controlling and utilizing the 
resources of a nation—or a coalition of nations—including its armed forces, to the 
end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against 
enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed. The highest type of strategy—
sometimes called grand strategy—is that which so integrates the policies and 
armaments of the nation that the resort to war is either rendered unnecessary or is 
undertaken with the maximum chance of victory.12 
In 1974 B.H. Liddell Hart, took the next important step towards the modern conception of grand 
strategy in his book Strategy, which examines the successful strategies employed in wars 
extending from those of the ancient Greeks through that of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49.13 His 
primary contribution to the study of grand strategy was that he was the first to articulate the idea 
that the central problem in grand strategy is how to balance a nation’s desired ends with its 
available means, as well as being the first to argue that the desired end of war is not simply 
military victory, but creating and sustaining a more favorable peace.14 When taken together, Hart 
and Earle form the conceptual basis for the modern realist approach to understanding grand 
strategy formation. 
Other important contributions to the field of grand strategy have been made by theorists 
looking at other areas of international relations, including the structure of international relations, 
game theory, trade, international political economy and national security. These include Kenneth 
Waltz’s Theory of International Politics (1979), which argues that in the absence of any power 
capable of enforcing commitments between states, nations operate in an anarchic or ‘self-help’ 
system and as result, he concludes that the most stable international system would consist of the 
                                                          
12 Earle, Edward Mead. 1973. Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press. P. viii 
 
13 Hart, Basil Henry Liddell. 1974. Strategy, 2nd rev. ed. New York: Plume 
 
14 Ibid, p.322, 353 and 357 
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fewest number of major powers with the greatest possible concentration of power in comparison 
to other states in the system.15 This conclusion is challenged by several of the authors included in 
Kenneth Oye’s Cooperation under Anarchy (1986), in which game theoretic methods are used to 
examine various conditions under which the fundamentally anarchic nature of international 
relations may be overcome.16 One example with significant implications for grand strategy is 
Robert Jervis’s chapter “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security 
Cooperation” which concludes that in periods following a conflict with a potential hegemon, 
“Anarchy and the security dilemma do not prevent a relatively high level of cooperation in the 
form of a concert system.”17 
 Another important work examining interstate cooperation is Stephen Walt’s The Origins 
of Alliances (1990), which argues for a “Balance of threat” approach, concluding that: 
[S]tates balance against the states that pose the greatest threat, and the latter need 
not be the most powerful states in the system. Just as national power is produced 
by several different components (e.g., military and economic capability, national 
resources and population), the level of threat that a state poses to others is the 
product of several interrelated components. Whereas balance of power theory 
predicts that states will react to imbalances of power, balance of threat theory 
predicts that when there is an imbalance of threat (i.e., when one state or coalition 
appears especially dangerous), states will form alliances or increase their internal 
efforts in order to reduce their vulnerability.18 
This is important because it helps to explain the alliance behavior of smaller states and the logic 
behind the pursuit of both revisionist and interventionist grand strategies by larger states 
                                                          
15 Waltz, Kenneth N. 2010. Theory of International Politics. Long Grove: Waveland Press. pp.106-210 
 
16 Oye, Kenneth. A. 1986. Cooperation Under Anarchy. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pp. 1-2 
 
17 Jervis, Robert. 1986. “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation.” Cooperation 
Under Anarchy. Eds. Kenneth Oye, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pg. 78 
 
18 Walt, Stephen M. 1990. The Origins of Alliances. Kindle Edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kindle Edition, 
Location 6995-7000 
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(especially the interventionist policy of containment as adopted by the U.S.).19 Another work 
contributing to our understanding of state behavior is Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, 
Interdependence and National Security edited by Blanchard et al (2000) in which authors 
examine the relationship between international trade and national security.20 One chapter with 
implications for grand strategy formation is “Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace” by 
Dale C. Copeland, who attempts to explain the period of détente (1970-1974) and the end of the 
cold war (1985-1991) by focusing on the effect a country’s expectation of future trade may have 
on their adoption of a peaceful versus aggressive strategy.21 Together the above works lay out 
some of the implications for strategy choice arising from relative state power, international 
norms, trade, and multinational cooperation. 
Furthermore, the problem of relating means to ends is a common one in international 
relations literature, especially in the closely related field of hegemony and hegemonic decline, 
which has focused on the ability of the most powerful states in the international system to 
maintain their economic, military and strategic superiority. Examples of this kind of research 
include: Krasner’s “State Power and the Structure of International Trade” (1976) which uses a 
combination of historical analysis and empirical data to conclude that “hegemony leads to a more 
open trading structure….”22 Gilpin’s US Power and the Multinational Corporation (1975) which 
                                                          
19 Walt, Stephen M. 1990. The Origins of Alliances. Kindle Edition. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Kindle Edition, 
Location 531-805. 
 
20 Blanchard, Jean-Marc, Edward D. Mansfield and Norrin M. Ripsman. 2000. Power and the Purse: Economic 
Statecraft, Interdependence and National Security. London: Frank Cass. 
 
21 Copeland, Dale C. 2000. “Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace: Détente 1970—74 and The End of The 
Cold War 1985—91.” Power and the Purse: Economic Statecraft, Interdependence and National Security. Eds. 
Blanchard, Jean-Marc, Edward D. Mansfield and Norrin M. Ripsman. London: Frank Cass. 
 
22 Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” World Politics, Vol.28, No.3 
(April 1976), pp. 335 
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argues that foreign direct investment (while providing some important initial advantages to the 
investing country) can, over time, cause the ‘periphery’ to develop at the cost of the international 
system’s ‘core’ countries, which can cause dependency on the periphery and increase 
international tensions, among other effects.23 And Ikenberry’s “The Future of the Liberal World 
Order” (2011) which argues that the increasing power of what were once countries in the 
‘periphery’ marks not the failure of the western system of free trade but its ultimate success with 
more and more nations developing by buying into the system lead by the ‘core’ nations (in 
particular the United States).24 
Examining the current literature on grand strategy, most authors follow one of two 
primary approaches: ‘realist’ approaches, and what Colin Dueck terms in Reluctant Crusaders 
(2006) as “constructivist” approaches.25 The realist approach views grand strategy as being 
primarily determined by forces originating outside of the state, while the constructivist approach 
views the most important factors as arising from within the state. Authors in each of these 
traditions have primarily relied on historical sources, including written reports and memoirs, as 
well as later analysis of the historical record and have incorporated theories from other areas of 
political science including international relations, political economy, and others. However, 
within each of these overarching traditions there are significant differences between authors over 
which factors, or combination of factors, are most important and about how much weight to give 
                                                          
23Gilpin, Robert. 1975 U.S. Power and The Multinational Corporation: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct 
Investment. New York: Basic Books, Inc. pp.76-78 
 
24 Ikenberry, John G. 2011. “The Future of the Liberal World Order.” Foreign Affairs. Vol. 90, No. 3 (May/June 
2011), pp. 56-68 
 
25 Dueck, Colin. 2006. Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, Kindle Edition, Loc. 117. 
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to the factors put forward by the other school. There have also been hybrid approaches, such as 
those based on Peter Gourevitch’s 1978 paper “The Second Image Reversed” which argues:  
The international system is not only a consequence of domestic politics and 
structures but a cause of them. Economic relations and military pressures constrain 
an entire range of domestic behaviors, from policy decisions to political forms. 
International relations and domestic politics are so interrelated that they should be 
analyzed simultaneously, as wholes.26  
Examples of the realist approach to analyzing grand strategy include studies by John Hattendorf 
(1991) “Alliance, Encirclement, and Attrition”,27 Michael Howard  (1991) “British Grand 
Strategy in World War I,28 and Eliot Cohen (1991) “Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World 
War II,”29 each of which  analyzed the grand strategies of coalition building and encirclement 
used with great success by Great Brittan in the War of Spanish Succession (Hattendorf), World 
War I (Howard) and World War II (Cohen), using historical case studies.  
Other studies have focused on using the realist approach to try to understand the reasons 
why some grand strategies have failed spectacularly, due to an inability to balance means with 
ends. These include Dale Copeland’s (2012) study: “Economic Interdependence and the Grand 
Strategies of Germany and Japan, 1925-1941” which examined the effect of declining trade 
expectations and high trade dependence on the grand strategy of Germany and Japan leading up 
                                                          
26 Gourevitch, Peter. 1978. “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics.”  
International Organization. Vol. 32, No. 4 (Autumn, 1978), pp.881-912. 
 
27 Hattendorf, John B. 1991. “Alliance Encirclement and Attrition: British Grand Strategy in the War of Spanish 
Succession, 1702-1713.” Grand Strategies in War and Peace. Ed. Paul Kennedy. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
pp. 11-29. 
 
28 Howard, Michael. 1991 “British Grand Strategy in World War I.” Grand Strategies in War and Peace. Ed. Paul 
Kennedy. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 31-41. 
 
29 Cohen, Eliot A. 1991. “Churchill and Coalition Strategy in World War II.” Grand Strategies in War and Peace. Ed. 
Paul Kennedy. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 43-67. 
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to World War II, and argues that the collapse of future trade expectations post 1929 lead to the 
adoption of more expansionistic and aggressive policies by both states. 30 Steven Lobell’s 
“Britain’s Grand Strategy during the 1930s From Balance of Power to Components of Power” 
(2012) argues using historical sources that the failed British grand strategy of the interwar years 
was the result of an attempt by the British to use component level power balancing, as opposed 
to traditional overall power balancing, in an attempt to deal with the combination of limited 
resources and a highly competitive security environment.31 Similarly, Norrin M. Ripsman and 
Jack S. Levy (2012) also use historical sources in “British Grand Strategy and the Rise of 
Germany, 1933-1936” to conclude that the failure of Britain to prevent the rise of Nazi Germany 
was the result of a well-intentioned, but failed, attempt to balance a number of threats to the 
British empire (including the rise of the Japanese navy in the east as well as Germany in Europe) 
while strictly limiting military spending to preserve the Empire’s long term economic viability.32 
Furthermore, the problem of balancing ends and means was by no means limited to the allies. Per 
Tsuyoshi Kawaski’s case study “The Rising Sun Was No Jackal” (2012), the primary Japanese 
motivation behind joining the Tripartite Pact was primarily to balance against rising U.S. power 
in the Pacific, and not bandwagoning on German success in Europe.33  Other works have 
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examined the relationship between military as well as economic factors and grand strategy, 
including: Paul Kennedy’s The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1989), which uses some 500 
years of the historical record to examine “the interaction between economics and strategy” and 
concluding that in the long run a nation’s economic power and military power are heavily 
interconnected, but that the relationship is not necessarily deterministic and may lag 
significantly.34 As well as Shaped by War and Trade by Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter 
(2002), which includes several chapters on ways that military and economic power has effected 
the development of the United States.35 For example, Martin Schefter’s chapter “War, Trade, and 
U.S. Party Politics” uses the historical record to examine some of the ways external forces have 
affected the development of party politics in the United States.36 
However, constructivist scholars have a very different view of the primary motivators of 
grand strategy, focusing instead on internal factors such as ideology and institutional effects. 
Examples include two articles on the importance of ideology in explaining Soviet grand strategy, 
one by Condoleezza Rice (1991)37 and another by Mark L. Hass (2012)38, both of which argue 
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that communist ideology heavily influenced Soviet grand strategy during the period leading up to 
World War II and throughout the Cold War. Other constructivist studies include Arther Ferrill’s 
(1991) study attributing the decline of the Roman Empire to an unwillingness on the part of 
Roman citizens to make the necessary sacrifices in terms of both taxation and military service 
required to maintain the empire;39 and a study by Dennis Showalter (1991) arguing that the 
German lack of an effective grand strategy was largely a result of the professionalization and 
separation of the German military and diplomatic services, with the resulting 
compartmentalization of their areas of responsibility leading to lack of communication and an 
inability to balance military means to political ends.40  
Ultimately, the realist and constructivist approaches are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, and a number of studies have used hybrid approaches. One example is a study by 
Peter Jackson (2012) which argues that both external factors (shifting balance of power in 
Europe, lack of British engagement) and internal factors (war weariness, etc.) were equally 
important in explaining changes in French grand strategy leading up to World War II.41 Another 
is J.H. Elliott’s (1991) study on the decline of Imperial Spain, which argues that it was a 
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combination of domestic factors (fear of decline) along with a changing external balance of 
power that caused Olivares to attempt a high risk grand strategy which ultimately failed.42 
There have also been a few attempts to create overall models of grand strategy formation. 
Examples include: The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2003) by John Mearsheimer, who 
contends that as a result of the anarchic nature of the international system great powers are 
forced to seek ways “to maximize their share of world power” what he calls “offensive 
realism.”43 Steven E. Lobell’s book, The Challenge of Hegemony (2005),  argues that the 
recursive interaction between the external economic / security environment, and the specific 
domestic coalitions which the external environment empowers, determines the grand strategy 
chosen by a declining hegemon and how effectively that hegemon will be able to stave off 
decline.44 Kevin Narizny’s (2007) book, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy, argues that 
the grand strategy adopted by a state is driven at its most fundamental level by the preferences of 
domestic groups (arising primarily from individual economic interests), preferences which are 
then constrained by various international and domestic factors, and finally, are aggregated by 
national leaders.45 Narizny’s work takes a similar view of grand strategy to that of Peter 
Trubowitz who in Politics and Strategy argues for an “executive choice” model of grand strategy 
formation, where a nation’s grand strategy is primarily determined by two variables: 
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“geopolitical slack” which is based on how secure a country’s position is against external threats 
and “party pressure” which represents domestic incentives and is a combination of several 
internal factors.46 Finally, in Reluctant Crusaders, Colin Dueck (2006) argues that grand strategy 
is driven primarily by international concerns, but is constrained to only a subset of the possible 
strategy choices by a nations ‘strategic culture’ due to the need for public buy in.47 
However, each of these prior studies has significant limitations. The primary problem 
with Lobell’s book is that it focuses exclusively on the period of decline at the end of a nation’s 
time as a great power. This ignores both the role of long term structural and institutional effects, 
which may be a result of the way the hegemon rose to power in the first place, making it more a 
theory about the causes of eventual decline, not about the way states formulate grand strategies. 
With respect to Narizny’s work, it is focused primarily on times of peace, uses an approach 
based primarily on domestic political factors, and has never been tested using quantitative 
methods. Both Trubowitz and Dueck base their work on a detailed analysis of a single 
democratic state and as with Narizny, the relative importance of the external versus internal 
factors is not clear. Finally, none of the previous models, including Mearshimer’s have ever been 
quantitatively tested.  These issues mean there is still a need for a more formal model of grand 
strategy selection which can be quantitatively verified and objectively applied. 
While uncommon, the use of statistical analysis techniques to examine important 
questions in international relations is by no means unique to this study. In particular, there are 
two previous studies which have used quantitative methodologies to examine theories with 
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significant implications for understanding grand strategy formation and for which the model 
results presented in this study may help to shed some additional light. The first is “democratic 
peace theory” as examined by James Lee Ray in Democracy and International Conflict (1995).48 
In Democracy and International Conflict Ray uses a combination of theoretical, statistical and 
historical analysis to examine regime change as well as the question of whether democracies 
have ever gone to war with one another. Of particular interest to this study is Ray’s conclusion 
that so far, he has not been able to find any examples of major wars waged by fully implemented 
democracies against each other.49 If the democratic peace theory is accurate, then one would 
expect democracies to prefer low risk and pro status quo strategies. A conclusion upon which 
which the quantitative models used in this study may be able to shed some light, and one which 
if accurate would lend weight to constructivist theories of grand strategy formation. The second 
study is Organski and Kugler’s The War Ledger (1980), which examines the effects of changes 
in the international distribution of national power on the risk a major (or hegemonic) war will 
occur.50 In The War Ledger Organski and Kugler conclude that: 
The dominant nation and the challenger are very likely to wage war on one another 
whenever the challenger overtakes in power the dominant nation. It is this shift that 
destabilizes the system and begins the slide toward war. The speed with which a 
challenger overtakes the dominant nation is also important: the faster one country 
overtakes the other, the greater the risk of war. These are necessary but not 
sufficient conditions…. Fighting begins, then, as a result of differential rates of 
growth between the contenders; and it subsequently assumes the proportions of a 
world war because of the obligations the major powers in each coalition have 
toward their respective leaders. 51 
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To reach this conclusion, Organski and Kugler examine a great deal of historical empirical data 
on the political, economic and military facets of national power, using a variety of statistical 
analysis techniques.52 While the models in this study are not specifically set up to test their 
hypotheses, if Organski and Kugler’s conclusions are accurate than one would expect that states 
which have only recently achieved great power status, and which have above average military 
and economic power, would be more likely to adopt revisionist strategies. Another theory closely 
related to the field of grand strategy which this study’s quantitative models may be able to 
provide some insight into, although one which has not as of yet been statistically tested, is the 
“security dilemma” presented by Robert Jervis, who uses a combination of game theory and 
historical record to argue that actions taken by a state intending to increase its security may in 
many cases decrease it by increasing the apparent threat of that state to its neighbors, causing 
them to respond in kind. 53  Of particular importance to this study is Jervis’s concept of an 
offensive-defensive balance and the idea that the prevailing military technology of the time may 
have a significant impact on how a state can go about increasing its security.54 It is this concept 
of offense-defense balance which is incorporated into the Relative Military Expenditures Per 
Personnel, and was added to the thee models in the study to help to separate the effect of overall 
Relative Military Strength from the potential effects of having different types of military forces 
at a nations disposal. 
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 This chapter has examined the current state of the field of grand strategy research. In 
addition, it is clear just how much the field depends on contributions from the whole spectrum of 
political science research, which may not be surprising given the overarching nature of grand 
strategy research. This chapter also shows the theoretical roots of the variables tested by the three 
models and makes it clear that this is by no means the first attempt to use quantitative techniques 
to shed light on aspects of grand strategy choice. 
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Chapter 3: 
Research Methodology 
 This chapter will discuss the research methodology adopted by this study including the 
main hypothesis to be tested, the meaning and construction of the dependent and independent 
variables to be tested and the techniques which will be used to test the two hypotheses. This 
study will use three types of multivariate regression analysis to examine the relationship between 
grand strategy choice and relative military and economic power, while controlling for other 
factors. My main hypothesis (𝐻1) is that as relative economic power increases, countries will 
have a higher probability of choosing pro status quo strategies (Interventionism and Legalism). 
This hypothesis is based on the idea that states which are winning (here doing well 
economically) under the current world order will be less likely to challenge the status quo. My 
second hypothesis (𝐻2) is that as relative military power increases, countries are more likely to 
choose high risk strategies (namely Interventionism or Revisionism). This is in line with 
offensive realism and the idea that more militarized states will be inclined to pursue higher risk 
strategies to achieve their goals. These hypotheses will be tested not only in terms of the 
accepted risk of war and whether a country chooses to be pro or anti status quo, but also by 
examining the effects on each of the four primary grand strategies individually. This leads to two 
null hypotheses: the first (HN1) is that there will be no exhibited relationship between relative 
economic power and the odds a state will be pro rather than anti-status quo. The second null 
hypotheses (HN2) is that increases in relative military power will exhibit no relationship to the 
risk of war a nation assumes. 
This study uses three different models with different regression techniques to analyze the 
effect of relative economic and military power on grand strategy choice. The first model uses a 
time series logit analysis to look at the effect of a series of lagged independent variables on 
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whether a power adopts a pro or anti-status quo posture. The second model uses a time series 
multivariate OLS regression model to analyze the effect of the same independent variables on the 
risk of major war which a great power assumes the following year. The third model combines the 
first two models by using a multinomial logit analysis with robust standard errors to examine the 
effect of the lagged independent variables on the odds of a nation adopting each of the four 
overarching grand strategies the following year. 
The dependent variable for the first model, whether a country is Anti-status Quo, is a 
dummy variable coded 1 if a nation is attempting to dramatically change its place in the current 
world order (ex. going from minor to major power, or going from major power to hegemon) at 
the expense of another power, or if a nation makes significant efforts to isolate itself from the 
current world order. The dependent variable for the second model is the Probability of a Major 
War, and was generated from a time series multivariate logit analysis using a dummy dependent 
variable coded 1 for years a country was involved in a major war, and independent lagged 
dummy variables coded 1 for years a country used the following strategies: Voluntary War, 
Binding, Blackmail / Subversion, Bloodletting, Internal Balancing, External Balancing, Buck 
passing / Retrenchment, Appeasement and Bandwagoning. Finally, the third dependent variable, 
Grand Strategy, was coded based on the following table; using the first two dependent variables, 
with the cut off for high risk being the acceptance of a non-trivial (1% or higher) probability of a 
major war occurring the following year, based on the combination of sub strategies chosen.55 The 
Grand Strategy variable represents a simplified version of Trubowitz’s typography of grand 
strategies found in his book Politics and Strategy, with his eleven listed strategies condensed 
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down to four overarching strategies. These in turn reflect the structure Trubowitz used to 
categorize his strategies, and was done in order to vastly simplify the number of possible 
combinations which would be addressed in the multinomial logit analysis in model three.56 
Table 1: Grand Strategy Chosen 
  Anti Status Quo Pro Status Quo 
High Risk Revisionist Interventionist 
Low Risk Isolationist / Neutral Legalist 
 
With respect to the independent variables, all three models use lagged versions of the 
following variables: relative military expenditure, relative military personnel, relative GDP, 
relative GDP per capita, nation age, homeland vulnerability, government type, economic system, 
and polity 2 score. These variables were either taken directly or derived from publicly available 
data provided by the Correlates of War Project57 (which aggregates the data from a number of 
peer reviewed papers to promote quantitative political science research), the Polity IV Project 
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from the Center of Systemic Peace58 (a nonprofit NGO which tracks the behavior of 167 
countries), and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development59. Each of the sub 
strategy variables was coded based on the historical record.  
These measures were chosen based on a care full review of the literature to best capture 
the concepts of economic and military strength found in the literature while still being 
sufficiently complete to allow for statistically significant results. These are by no means the only 
way to quantify these concepts, and other potential measures were considered, such as years 
great power, exports, and others. However, many of these potential variables were dropped for 
lack of data or after correlational analysis indicated significant overlap with other variables. 
Furthermore, it was decided that instead of using the numerical values for the economic and 
military power variables, that it would be more appropriate to use a ‘relative’ measure which 
took each great power’s raw score for that year and divided it by the sample average of all of the 
great powers combined for that year. In addition to creating more meaningful measures for the 
concept of relative power, using these variables helps to reduce serial autocorrelation problems 
as well as any potential problems arising from differences in the way the underlying military and 
economic variables may have been measured over time. Finally, when appropriate, robust 
regression techniques were used to address potential problems with heteroscedasticity, auto 
correlation and others. 
 In order to minimize the potential complexity of the system being examined, it was 
decided to use data only from great powers and to focus exclusively on their strategy for dealing 
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with other great powers. This eliminates potential multi-level issues where the strategies of lesser 
states could be limited or affected by the wishes of more powerful ‘patron’ states. Furthermore, 
the potential for a major war which could threaten the survival of a great power means that one 
would expect the grand strategies chosen by a great power with respect to other such powers to 
be as carefully thought out and rational as possible. Finally, great powers have some of the best 
developed bureaucracies and thus offer the most complete data available for the longest possible 
duration. In this case data from all of the great powers in existence from 1892 to 2012 was used 
with the exception of China since its economic and military data is too unreliable to be 
incorporated at this time. 
This chapter gave a detailed examination of the methods by which this study will go 
about examining the relationship between relative economic and military power and grand 
strategy choice. Overall, if proponents of realist models of grand strategy are correct then 
external variables: such as relative numbers of military personnel, relative military spending, 
relative GDP, relative GDP per capita and homeland vulnerability, should have a statistically and 
substantively significant effect on grand strategy choice in the three models, after controlling for 
other variables. On the other hand, if proponents of constructivist models of grand strategy 
choice are correct, then institutional and societal variables like government type, economic 
system, nation age and polity2 score will be statistically and substantively significant. 
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Chapter 4 
Detailed Discussion of Data: 
 This chapter examines in detail the data which was collected for the study and the way 
this data was collected and organized. The first step in the process was data collection and 
determining how large a sample of countries would be compared and for what duration. As 
stated previously, given the complexity of multi-level models, it was decided to begin by only 
looking at Great Powers, states which have the most freedom in developing their own strategies 
and which do not have to worry about how their chosen strategy will be modified by the interests 
of a more powerful backer state. The next major limitation to the sample was data availability, 
this limited both how far back the study could go and which countries could be included. Luckily 
there was sufficient data to include all of the major powers (which the exception of modern 
China, for which the data was considered too unreliable), as far back as at least 1892, the date 
which was chosen to be the beginning of the study. This date corresponds to the U.S. first 
achieving the status of a first rank power, as evidenced by European powers upgrading their 
diplomatic missions to the status of full ambassadors.60  
The next step in the process was the creation of the dependent variables for the three 
models. This began by coding the following sub strategy variables: Voluntary war, Binding, 
Blackmail / Subversion, Bloodletting, Internal Balancing, External Balancing, Buckpassing / 
Retrenchment, Appeasement and Bandwagoning, as well as whether or not a nation’s foreign 
policy was Pro or Anti-status quo in nature. These strategies were coded based on the foreign 
policy actions of each of the great powers during the period examined and are a modified and 
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condensed version of the strategies listed by Trubowitz,61with some strategies combined and 
others removed. For example: Trubowitz’s ‘Wars of Conquest’ and ‘Preemptive War’ have been 
combined into ‘Voluntary War.’ Just to be clear, according to Trubowitz “Preemptive wars seek 
to forestall a shift in the balance of power by strategically attacking before an adversary does,62” 
a relatively broad definition. ‘Imperialism’ was removed because it relates primarily to relations 
between greater powers and lesser states, not amongst great powers themselves. Finally, 
‘Spheres of Influence’ was dropped because it also relates heavily to the way great powers 
interact with lesser powers and because the desire to create spheres of influence was nearly 
universal among the great powers for the period examined. 
With respect to coding the first dependent variable (Pro or Anti Status quo), for a nation 
to be coded as Anti Status quo, it must be attempting to dramatically change its place in the 
current world order at the expense of another great power, or make significant efforts to isolate 
itself from the current world order. Examples of anti-status quo behavior include not only 
Revisionist states like Nazi Germany, but also Isolationist states like North Korea, and even the 
United States in its early years. Turning to the ten sub strategy variables: a Voluntary War is one 
in which participation by the party in question was voluntary (even if done to help another state) 
and are directed either directly at another great power, or at its Allies / material interests / 
strategic position. Voluntary wars are not always anti-status quo and range from the Nazi 
invasion of Poland, to the United States entering World War 1 on behalf of the allies. Binding is 
when countries use negotiation and treaties to lock in relative advantage, this can include both 
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economic and security arrangements, and can include anything from setting up 3rd party deals to 
protect regional stability to setting up international organizations, as long as the primary 
motivation of the country being assessed is to promote its own interests. A classic example of 
binding is the creation of NATO which looked to check Russian influence in Europe while 
expanding U.S. influence there. Blackmail / Subversion is a catch all for actions short of war, 
whether military, political or economic, other than intelligence gathering and bloodletting, which 
are directed at another major power (or rising power) or its direct interests. An example of just 
how expansive this category can be is that it not only covers Kennedy’s Naval blockade of Cuba, 
but also the actions taken by the U.S. in the 1930’s to limit Nazi influence in South America. 
Bloodletting is when a power is deliberately trying to sap the military and economic strength of 
another power that is engaged with a 3rd party, either through supporting that 3rd party or by 
denying timely aid promised to the targeted power. This includes, but is by no means limited to 
the involvement of outside powers in proxy wars like Vietnam and Afghanistan. On the other 
hand, Intelligence gathering was not tracked as it is effectively a universal aspect of great power 
politics. 
 Continuing with the sub strategy variables, according to Trubowitz, Internal Balancing is 
when “a leader is relying on the states own resources to deter a potential aggressor or to defend 
against the foreign aggressor should deterrence fail,”63 The most familiar example of this would 
be the U.S. entry into World War II following the attack on Pearl Harbor. External Balancing is 
when a nation tries “to check a threatening state by pooling resources with other states through 
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the formation of alliances.”64 Examples of this include military alliances such as NATO, which 
often serve other functions for such as Binding.  Buckpassing / Retrenchment is when a power 
either refuses to act in the face of a recognized potential threat, abandons its commitments in an 
area (leaving a power vacuum to be filled by another power) or reduces its forces in that area to a 
level where it can no longer compete for preeminence in the region. An example of this are the 
Neutrality Acts passed by the United States Congress in the 1930’s which prevented the United 
States from intervening to prevent the rise of Nazi Germany. Trubowitz defines Appeasement as 
“efforts by a leader to conciliate or ‘buy off’ a potential aggressor by making unilateral 
diplomatic and economic concessions.”65 The classic example of this is Chamberlin trading the 
Sudetenland to Hitler in return for Hitler giving up any further territorial ambitions. Finally, 
Bandwagoning is when “leaders willingly subordinate their states and themselves to [a] foreign 
power” an abbreviated version of the definition used by Trubowitz, since in cases like the post 
World War II British relationship with the U.S., it is not necessary that the subordinating power 
be subordinating itself to the challenging power. 
The next step was to construct the dependent variable for the second model, Probability 
of a Major War. This was generated from a time series multivariate logit analysis using a dummy 
dependent variable coded 1 for years a country was involved in a major war (and zero 
otherwise), with the lagged independent dummy variables for each of the sub strategies serving 
as independent variables. This logit regression then was used to predict a probability of major 
war breaking out the following year for the combination of sub strategies a country employed 
that year. The third dependent variable ‘Grand Strategy’ was then coded using a combination of 
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the first two dependent variables. Anti-status quo countries which accepted a non-trivial risk of 
major war were coded as revisionist, while anti-status quo countries which employed low risk 
policies were coded as isolationist / neutral. Finally, pro status quo high risk nations were coded 
as interventionist and pro status quo low risk countries were coded as being legalist. 
 The final steps in collecting the data was to compile the independent variables for the 
three models and to create the relative power variables. The independent variables were either 
coded directly based on the historical record or come from one of the following three sources: 
Variables on Relative Military Expenditure and Relative Military Personnel, and Relative 
Military Expenditure per Personnel were constructed by taking data on military personnel and 
military expenditures from the Correlates of War Project and dividing each country by the 
sample average for that year.66 The variables on Relative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 
Relative Per Capita GDP were created by taking OECD data on historical GDP and Per Capita 
GDP by Angus Maddison (2006).67 Each of these relative power variables is a scale with a score 
of one representing a country having the sample average value, and with values usually ranging 
from around 0.05 (or one twentieth of the sample average) to about 3.5 or three and a half times 
the sample average for that year. Relative rather than absolute measures were chosen to address 
several major potential issues. First, using relative measures of military and economic power 
better captures the realist literatures emphasis on a country’s relative military and economic 
position as determinants of strategy choice. Second, using a relative measure based on the 
sample average for that year, reduces statistical issues associated with potential time based 
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inflationary effects in panel models and reduces any potential problems associated with potential 
changes in the way the data may have been tracked overtime.68  Next, the Polity 2 Score was 
taken from the Polity Project.69 The Polity 2 Score represents the most complete and statistically 
friendly measure of how autocratic versus democratic a country’s government is, with a score 
ranging from -10 (for a fully institutionalized autocratic state) to 10 (for a fully institutionalized 
democratic one). Originally, separate autocratic and democratic variables were going to be used 
(as recommended by the Center for Systemic Peace) but there was too much correlation between 
them to use both in the model.  
Finally, background data such as Nation Age, as well as Homeland Vulnerability, 
Government Type, Economic System and Years since Last Major War Ended were coded based 
on the historical record. Homeland Vulnerability is the number of other great powers which 
share a land border with the country. Government type was coded one for monarchy, two for 
presidential democracy, three for parliamentary democracy and four for dictatorships. Economic 
System was coded one for Liberal (free trading), two for Marxist and three for Mercantilist. 
Government type and Economic system variables were then split into a series of dummy 
variables when used in the models as it is a necessary step in order for the statistical models to 
properly interpret nominal, rather than ordinal variables. Table 2 (below) gives summary 
statistics for the included data.  
 
                                                          
68 Fox, John. 1991. Regression Diagnostics. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. Kindle Edition Loc. 163 
 
69 Taken from Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
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This chapter examined the data utilized in the study including: what it represents, from 
where and how it was collected, and how it was organized. While this study includes original 
data in the form of the coding of the various sub-strategies, one of the things that the analysis of 
the data makes clear is that studies such as this one cannot be realistically carried out without the 
hard work of many of our fellow researchers and without the cooperation of both governmental 
and nongovernmental organizations around the world. Furthermore, the increasing availability of 
this data means that we are just beginning to explore ability of quantitative analysis to shed light 
on important questions in the field of international relations. 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Included Data 
Variables: Observations: Mean: Min: Max: Std. Deviation: 
Country Background Variables:      
Year 430 1933 1892 2012 29.957 
Nation Age 430 106.94 1 242 75.19 
Sub Strategy Variables:      
Anti Status Quo 430 0.37 0 1 0.48 
Voluntary War 430 0.12 0 1 0.33 
Binding 430 0.90 0 1 0.31 
Blackmail / Subversion 430 0.40 0 1 0.49 
Bloodletting 430 0.08 0 1 0.28 
Internal Balancing 430 0.65 0 1 0.48 
External Balancing 430 0.68 0 1 0.47 
Buckpassing / Retrenchment 430 0.10 0 1 0.30 
Appeasement 430 0.02 0 1 0.15 
Bandwagoning 430 0.02 0 1 0.14 
War and Strategy Variables:      
Obligatory War 430 0.16 0 1 0.36 
Major War 430 0.27 0 1 0.45 
Probability of Major War****  421 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.04 
Years Since Last Major War 
Ended 
430 10.51 0 46 11.67 
Strategy (Grand Strategy 
Chosen) 
430 1.91 0 3 0.98 
Independent Variables Used:      
R_MilExPer* (Relative 
Expenditure per Personnel) 
408 1 0.09 4.05 0.72 
R_milex* (Relative Military 
Expenditures) 
409 1 0.04 3.46 0.60 
R_milper* (Relative Military 
Personnel) 
408 1 0.05 3.54 0.56 
R_GdpMGK** (Relative GDP) 379 1 0.08 3.01 0.67 
R_Gdp_PC** (Relative per 
capita GDP) 
374 1 0.27 1.57 0.34 
Homeland Vulnerability 430 0.91 0 4 1.33 
Polity2 score*** 428 3.00 -10 10 7.43 
Government Type 430 2.34 1 4 1.08 
Economic System 430 2.24 1 3 0.88 
            
*Derived from data from Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington 
DC: CQ Press 
**Derived from Maddison, Angus (2006) The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and Volume 2 
Historical Statistics. OECD Development Centre 
***Taken from Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
**** for sub strategies chosen, from xtlogit predict command 
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Chapter 5 
Data Analysis: 
This chapter will give the statistically significant results for each of the three models used 
in this study in table form. In addition, it will provide some context for these results by 
discussing the statistically significant results of each model in detail in the text accompanying 
each model. Given the complexity and interactive nature of Model 3’s results, its implications for 
the United States will be discussed in detail in chapter 6, while an overview of its predictions for 
the other great powers will be given in chapter 7.  With respect to the testing of the hypotheses, 
the first and third models will test H1, while the second and third models will test H2.  
Model 1: 
The first model uses a time series logit analysis to examine relationship between relative 
military and economic power and whether a country adopts an anti-status quo strategy the 
following year. The results of the logit analysis are given in Table 3 below, and looking at the 
model as a whole it is clear from the Wald chi2 of 61.07 and corresponding p-value of 0.00, that 
we can reject the null hypotheses of no improvement for the overall model. Looking at each of 
the independent variables, we see that Relative Military Expenditures per Personnel, Nation Age, 
Homeland Vulnerability, and Parliamentary Democracy are all statistically significant to the 5 
percent level or better for the two-tailed test. By comparison, the effects of Relative Military 
Personnel, Military Expenditures, Relative Per Capita GDP and Relative GDP were not 
statistically significant, nor were Years Since Major War, Dictatorship, Presidential Democracy 
or Polity 2 Score. Unfortunately, Economic System could not be included in the model without 
causing convergence issues or dropping approximately one third of the observations. 
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Notes:      
*Base Government Type was Monarchy 
 
Data derived from: 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press, 
 
Maddison, Angus (2006) The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and Volume 2 
Historical Statistics. OECD Development Centre, 
 
Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
 
  
 
 
Table 3: Model 1: Effect of Relative Economic and Military Power as well as Governmental 
and Economic Variables on Whether a Nation is Anti Status Quo the Following Year 
 
 
Odds Ratio Std. Error P > |z| Z Score 
Rel. Mil. Expend. per Mil. 
Personnel 
11.90 11.14 0.008 2.64 
Relative Military Personnel 13.43 22.15 0.115 1.57 
Relative Military Expenditure 1.79 1.48 0.482 0.70 
Relative GDP 1.49 2.21 0.788 0.27 
Relative Per Capita GDP 1.97 8.09 0.869 0.16 
Nation Age 0.85 0.03 0.000 -4.78 
Homeland Vulnerability 0.03 0.03 0.000 -3.79 
Polity 2 Score 1.19 0.25 0.425 0.80 
Years Since Major War 1.03 0.24 0.160 1.40 
Government Type*     
Presidential Democracy 0.01 0.28 0.108 -1.61 
Parliamentary Democracy 0.001 0.001 0.000 -3.91 
Dictatorship 0.02 0.06 0.256 -1.13 
      
  
Number of Observations 366     
Wald chi2 61.07     
Prob > chi2 0.0000     
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Moving on to a closer examination of the relative power variables, we see that the effect 
of Relative Military Expenditures per Personnel is not only statistically significant at the 1% 
level for the two-tailed test, but is also substantively significant. Hence we see a one unit 
increase in Relative Military Expenditures per Personnel increasing the odds of a country 
choosing an Anti-status quo Strategy the following year by a factor of 11.9 holding all other 
variables constant. Thus, a great power which spends twice as much per military personnel on 
the military than an ‘average’ great power, is almost twelve times more likely to pursue an anti-
status quo strategy the following year. This indicates that countries which invest considerably 
more per soldier in their militaries than their rivals are more likely to challenge the status quo, 
and is in line with realist arguments such as those by Mearsheimer, who argues that states with 
greater military power will attempt to use that power to improve their position in the 
international system, and Jervis’s theory about offense-defense balance.70 It may also be a result 
of the need for states which want to project power to invest heavily in capital intensive aspects of 
the military including logistics and mobility, which defensively oriented forces do not require.  
The Homeland Vulnerability variable was also statistically significant at better than the 
.01 level, with a one unit increase in the number of great powers which share a nations boarder 
corresponding to a 97 percent decrease in the odds of a nation adopting an anti-status quo 
strategy the following year. This indicates that states which are more vulnerable to direct attack 
from rivals are much more likely to buy into the international system and are less likely to 
directly challenge the status quo than states which are operating from a secure homeland, with 
                                                          
70 Mearsheimer, John J. (2003). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. NewYork: W.W. Norton and Company. Kindle 
Edition location 253. 
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perhaps the ultimate example of a vulnerable, pro status quo state, being the Austrian Hungarian 
Empire. 
 Turning now to the structural indicators, Nation Age and Parliamentary Democracy, were 
both statistically significant at the .01 level, or better, for the two-tailed test. Looking at Nation 
Age, a one year increase in a country’s age corresponds to a 15% reduction in the odds of 
choosing an anti-status quo strategy the following year. This means that as nations age they are 
increasingly likely to choose to pursue pro status quo strategies. Although this tendency may be a 
result of pro status quo states surviving longer, it also provides support for Organski and 
Kugler’s conclusions in The War Ledger.71 For example, if a great power maintains its status for 
twenty years, its odds of choosing a pro status quo strategy increase by a factor of three. Finally, 
Parliamentary Democracies are 99.9 percent more likely to choose a pro status quo policy the 
following year than Monarchies, with all other factors being equal; indicating a strong pro status 
quo preference on the part of Parliamentary Democracies, providing some support for 
democratic peace theory. Looking at Model 1 overall, it is apparent that a mix of relative and 
structural variables affect whether a state follows a pro or anti status quo strategy, although the 
variables tested represent only a partial sample of those which may have a statistically significant 
effect. 
 
  
                                                          
71 Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition Loc. 
3082 
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Model 2: 
The second model uses a time series ordinary least squares regression analysis with panel 
corrected standard errors to examine the relationship between relative military and economic 
power and the risk of war a country assumes the following year (here measured by the 
probability of major war based on the sub strategies chosen that year). The results of the OLS 
analysis are given in Table 4 below, and looking at the model as a whole, it is clear from the 
Wald chi2 of 107.00 and R-squared of 0.39, that we can reject the null of no improvement for the 
overall model. 
Looking at each of the independent variables, we see that Relative Military Expenditures 
per Personnel, Relative Military Expenditure, Homeland Vulnerability, Years Since Major War, 
Presidential Democracy and Dictatorship were all statistically significant to the 5 percent level 
for the two-tailed test, while Relative Per Capita GDP was significant at the 10% level. Among 
the relative power variables, only the effects of Relative Military Personnel and Relative GDP 
were not statistically significant, while several of the structural variables, including Nation Age, 
Economic System, Parliamentary Democracy and Polity 2 Score were not statistically 
significant. 
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Notes:      
*Base Government Type was Monarchy, **Base Economic System was Liberal 
 
Data derived from: 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press, 
 
Maddison, Angus (2006) The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and Volume 2 
Historical Statistics. OECD Development Centre, 
Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
 
 
Table 4: Model 2; Effect of Relative Economic and Military Power as well as Governmental 
and Economic Variables on Risk of Major War the Following Year 
 
 
Coefficient 
Panel Corrected 
Std. Error P > |z| Z Score 
Rel. Expend. Per Personnel 0.014 0.005 0.006 2.78 
Relative Military Personnel -0.007 0.010 0.463 -0.73 
Relative Military Expenditure -0.018 0.006 0.006 -2.76 
Relative GDP 0.003 0.005 0.525 0.64 
Relative Per Capita GDP 0.038 0.021 0.076 1.77 
Nation Age 0.0001 0.00008 0.206 1.26 
Homeland Vulnerability 0.036 0.006 0.000 6.09 
Years Since Major War -0.003 .00003 0.000 -8.48 
Polity 2 Score 0.0005 0.001 0.705 0.38 
Economic System**     
Marxist -0.004 0.027 0.889 -0.14 
Mercantilist -0.001 0.010 0.931 -0.09 
Government Type*     
Presidential Democracy -0.033 0.012 0.004 -2.85 
Parliamentary Democracy -0.013 0.013 0.319 -1.00 
Dictatorship 0.056 0.019 0.003 2.95 
     
  
Number of Observations 366     
R-squared 0.39     
Wald chi2 107.00     
Prob > chi2 0.00     
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 Turning to a closer examination of the relative power variables, Relative Military 
Expenditures Per Personnel was not only statistically significant at the one percent level, but was 
also substantively significant, with a one unit increase in Relative Military Personnel increasing 
the probability of major war the following year by 1.4 percentage points holding all other 
variables constant. Given that a state which spends the sample average per military personnel has 
about a 2% chance of being involved in a major war (all else being held constant), a great power 
which spends 4 times the sample average per personnel (within the maximum observed) more 
than triples their odds of being involved in a major war the following year. Also, it is important 
to keep in mind that while the risk of war in any given year is generally very small 
(approximately 2%), these wars are cataclysmic events making countries sensitive to even small 
fluctuations in the odds. To put it another way, a country which spends the average per soldier 
for a great power that year, holding all else constant, will likely be involved in a major war every 
50 years. However, a great power which spends near the sample maximum per soldier will, 
holding all else constant, likely be involved in a major conflict every 16.1 years. This would 
seem to be clear evidence in favor of a link between military power and risk taking, along the 
lines of Mearsheimer’s ‘offensive realism,’ but the evidence is more complex.72  
Moving on to Relative Military Expenditures, which was also significant at the one 
percent level, we see the exact opposite relationship to that of Relative Expenditures per 
Personnel, with a one unit increase in relative military expenditures decreasing the odds of being 
involved in a major conflict the following year by 1.8 percentage points. This result is surprising 
and when taken along with the effect of Relative Military Expenditures Per Personnel, is another 
                                                          
72 Mearsheimer, John J. (2003). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. NewYork: W.W. Norton and Company. Kindle 
Edition location 177. 
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indication that the configuration of a nation’s military may have a greater effect on a country’s 
choice of strategies than either its size or cost alone. This provides some statistical evidence for 
the effect of some form of the offense – defense balance and resulting security dilemma 
proposed by Robert Jervis.73 It is also important to note that in those cases where both Relative 
Military Expenditures and Relative Military Expenditures per Personnel increase, the effect of 
Relative Military Expenditures is likely to dominate the effect of increased Expenditures Per 
Personnel since Relative Military Expenditures has a larger effect per unit change (coefficient), 
potentially contradicting not only the conclusions of Mearshimer74, but also to some extent 
Organski and Kugler.75 
Another statistically significant relative power variable and the only statistically 
significant economic variable (although only at the 10% level), was Relative Per Capita GDP. A 
one unit increase in Relative Per Capita GDP corresponds to a 3.8 percentage point increase in 
the risk of war the following year. This is more than twice the effect of the relative military 
power variables per unit change, but is constrained by the fact that there is far less extreme 
variation in Relative per Capita GDP, with a minimum value of 0.27 and maximum value of 
1.57, a range of about 1.3 units. Compare this to the range of other relative power variables such 
as Relative Military Expenditures, which has a minimum of .04 and a maximum of 3.56, a 
variance of over three and a half units. Thus overall, the substantive impact of Relative per 
Capita GDP may be less than that of Relative Military Expenditures. Furthermore, the fact that 
                                                          
73 Jervis, Robert. (1978). “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics, Vol.30, No.2 (January 1978). 
pp. 186-214 
 
74 Mearsheimer, John J. (2003). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. NewYork: W.W. Norton and Company. Kindle 
Edition location 177. 
 
75 Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition Loc. 
3082 
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countries with higher levels of GDP seem to be willing to shoulder greater risks than countries 
with lower levels of per capita GDP indicates that we may need to re-evaluate the aphorism that 
the most dangerous countries are those with nothing to lose. Instead it seems to be those 
countries whose citizens have higher per capita incomes than their rivals that seem to be most 
aggressive, although whether this is a result of feeling compelled to defend the status quo or to 
challenge it is one of the things which should become clearer when we look at model 3. This is in 
line with Mearsheimer’s76arguments in favor of “offensive realism” since great powers with the 
most available resources seem to be the most combative, as well as with Organski and Kugler77 
argument that wars are most likely to occur when a challenger has equaled or exceeded the 
military and economic power of the current hegemon. Taken together, the military and economic 
results show a direct link between economic power and the adoption of high risk strategies, but a 
much more complex relationship between military power and risk taking. 
Turning to the last statistically significant structural variable, Homeland Vulnerability, 
we see that a one unit increase in the number of other powers which a state boarders increases 
the probability of a major war occurring the following year by 3.6 percentage points. Thus, a 
country like Imperial Russia which bordered 4 other powers would increase its risk of being 
involved in a major war by 10.8 percentage points, or a factor of six. This argues that great 
                                                          
76 Mearsheimer, John J. (2003). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. NewYork: W.W. Norton and Company. Kindle 
Edition location 177. 
 
77 Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition Loc. 
3082 
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powers which directly border other powers may be more tightly locked into a zero sum game 
with their neighbors where security is concerned and thus more open to taking risks.78 
 Moving on to the statistically significant structural variables, beginning with Years Since 
Major War, which was statistically significant at the one percent level for the two tailed test, we 
see that each year after the end of a major war decreases the odds of being involved in another 
major war the next year by 0.3 percentage points. This means that the longer it has been since a 
country has been involved in a major conflict, the less likely they are to be involved in a major 
conflict the next year. The converse of this is that countries which have recently been involved in 
major conflicts are the ones most vulnerable to being involved in the future, creating a self-
perpetuating cycle. Moving on to Presidential Democracy which was also significant at the one 
percent level, we see that presidential democracies are 3.3 percentage points less likely to be 
involved in a major war the following year than Monarchies, holding all other variables constant. 
This provides some statistical evidence for democratic peace theory. By comparison, we see that 
Dictatorships (which were also significant at the one percent level) have the opposite effect, with 
Dictatorships being 5.6 percentage points more likely to be involved in a major conflict the 
following year than Monarchies. This is the largest coefficient of any of the statistically 
significant variables and provides strong evidence for arguments that, among great powers at 
least, Dictatorships are more likely to take actions which risk starting major wars. 
 
 
                                                          
78 For a historical example see: Lynn II, John A. 2011 “The Grand Strategy of the Grand Siècle: Learning from the 
wars of Louis XIV.” The Shaping of Grand Strategy: Policy, Diplomacy and War. Eds. Williamson Murry, Richard Hart 
Sinnreich and James Lacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kindle Edition pp. 38-62 
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Model 3: 
The third model uses a multinomial logit analysis with robust standard errors to examine 
the relationship between relative military and economic power and a nation’s choice of grand 
strategy the following year. The statistically significant results of the multinomial logit analysis 
are given in Tables 5a1-5a4 below, with the full results of the analysis (organized by independent 
variable type) are presented in tables 5b1-5b4 in the appendix. Looking at the model as a whole 
it is clear from the pseudo R-squared of 0.68, that we can reject the null of no improvement for 
the overall model.  
Beginning with the statistically significant relative military power variables (Table 5a1 
below), we can see that Relative Military Expenditures per Military Personnel, Relative Military 
Personnel and Relative Military Expenditures, all had statistically significant effects on grand 
strategy choice the following year. Looking at the effects of Relative Expenditures per 
Personnel, we can see that, holding all other variables constant, a one-unit increase in Relative 
Expenditures per Personnel increases the odds of a country choosing an Interventionist rather 
than a Legalist strategy the following year by a factor of 7.2. While, holding all other variables 
constant, a one-unit increase in Relative Expenditures per Personnel increases the odds of 
choosing a Revisionist vs. Legalist Grand Strategy by a factor of 32.5. Both of these results were 
significant at the 1% level or better for the two tailed test. Taken together these results indicate 
that the as Relative Expenditures per Military Personnel increases, countries are more likely to 
choose higher risk strategies such as Interventionism or Revisionism, at least compared to a 
Legalist approach, which is in line with the results of model 2. 
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Table 5a1: Model 3; Statistically Significant Effects of Relative Military Power 
Variables on Grand Strategy Choice the Following Year 
 
 
Coefficient Z Score P > |z| % Change 
Rel. Expend. Per Personnel     
Legalist vs. Interventionist -1.97 -2.095 0.036 -86.1 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -3.48 -3.697 0.000 -96.9 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 1.97 2.095 0.036 619.1 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 3.48 3.696 0.000 3149.9 
Relative Military Personnel     
Legalist vs. Isolationist -8.77 -3.111 0.002 -100.0 
Legalist vs. Interventionist -3.80 -2.433 0.015 -97.8 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -4.92 -3.145 0.002 -99.3 
Isolationist vs. Legalist 8.77 3.111 0.002 643467.1 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 3.80 2.433 0.015 4369.4 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 4.92 3.061 0.002 13488.7 
Relative Military Expenditure     
Legalist vs. Interventionist 2.62 2.541 0.011 1274.4 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 1.75 1.695 0.090 474.5 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -2.62 -2.541 0.011 -92.7 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -1.75 -1.839 0.066 -82.6 
Number of Observations 366  
Pseudo R-squared 0.6789  
Pseudo Log Likelihood -145.63  
Notes: 
Underline 
 
= more likely strategy choice 
 
Data derived from: 
 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to 
War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press, 
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For Relative Military Personnel, holding all other variables constant, a one-unit increase 
in Relative Military Personnel increases the odds of a country choosing an Isolationist instead of 
Legalist Grand Strategy the following year by a factor of 6,436. In addition, a one-unit increase 
in Relative Military Personnel increases the odds of a country choosing an Interventionist, as 
opposed to Legalist, Grand Strategy by a factor of 44.7. Finally, a one-unit increase in Relative 
Military Personnel also increases the odds of a country choosing a Revisionist vs. Legalist Grand 
Strategy by a factor of 136. All of these effects were significant at the .05 level or better for the 
two-tailed test. Here the power of a multinomial logit analysis versus the previous models comes 
to the forefront, because it can show that a one unit increase in Relative Military Personnel 
reduces the odds of a country choosing a legalist strategy by at least 97% compared to any other 
strategy. In contrast to the previous models, which when taken together, only predict that a one 
unit increase in Relative Military Personnel should correspond to an increase likelihood of 
choosing an isolationist grand strategy, which is accurate, but gives an incomplete picture of the 
variable’s effects. 
Moving on to Relative Military Expenditures, a one unit increase in Relative Military 
Expenditures increases the odds of a country choosing a Legalist as opposed to Interventionist 
Grand Strategy the following year by a 1,274%, holding all other variables constant. However, a 
one unit increase in Relative Military Expenditures increases the odds of a country choosing a 
Legalist vs. Revisionist Grand Strategy by 475%. Both were statistically significant at the 10% 
level or better. Overall, increasing Relative Military Expenditures has the opposite effect of 
increasing Expenditures per Personnel, which creates an interesting dynamic and one which 
plays out in the second model as well. Another important point to keep in mind is that the only 
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statistically significant effects of the military power variables relate to the odds of a nation 
choosing whether to adopt a Legalist Grand Strategy. Thus, as Military Expenditures Per 
Personnel and Relative Military Personnel increase, the odds of a country adopting a Legalist 
Grand Strategy decrease; while as Relative Military Expenditures increases, the odds of choosing 
a Legalist Grand Strategy increases, indicating that the way a great power structures its military 
forces may have a bigger impact on strategy choice than its raw power alone. 
Looking at the three Relative Military Power Variables combined (see Table 5a2 below), 
we see that they primarily affect the odds of a state adopting a legalist strategy, with increases in 
Expenditures per Personnel and Relative Military Personnel overall both corresponding to 
decreased odds of choosing a Legalist Grand Strategy. Only Relative Military Expenditures was 
positively correlated with a Legalist Grand Strategy. The interconnected nature of the Relative 
Military Power variables makes their analysis more complicated since a significant increase in 
one variable will correspond to a decrease in another variable unless a third variable is changed 
as well. For example, a one unit increase in Relative Military Personnel will decrease Relative 
Expenditures per Personnel (but not necessarily by one unit), with each of these changes having 
the opposite effect on the odds of a country adopting a Legalist Grand Strategy, unless Relative 
Military Expenditures are also increased. If Relative Military Expenditures was also increased, 
then Relative Expenditures Per Personnel would remain relatively static, but the increase in 
Relative Military Expenditures also has the opposite effect on the odds of country choosing a 
Legalist Grand Strategy than the increase in Relative Military Personnel. This is further 
complicated by the scale of the effects of each of the Relative Military Power Variables. For 
example, in the above scenarios, the effect of a one unit increase in Relative Military Personnel 
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will drown out a similar increase in either of the other variables since its effects are several times 
larger per unit increase. 
Examining relative economic power variables (Relative GDP and Relative per Capita 
GDP in Table 5a2 below), we can see that the economic effects have the most impact on whether 
a nation choses to adopt a Revisionist Grand Strategy. For example, holding all other factors 
constant, a one unit increase in Relative GDP decreases the likelihood a country will choose a 
Legalist, as opposed to Revisionist, strategy by 98.6%.  At the same time, a one unit increase in 
Relative Per capita GDP increases the odds a nation will choose a Revisionist vs. Isolationist 
strategy by 35,314%.  Both of these results were significant at the .05 level or better. Taken 
together these results indicate that as a great power’s finances improve they are more likely to 
choose a Revisionist Grand Strategy. This result provides some evidence that a countries ability 
to finance a potential conflict may be a limiting factor in choosing risky or aggressive grand 
strategies, in both absolute terms and in terms of its effects on internal coalitions, and is in line 
with the arguments of Trubowitz and others.79 This finding is consistent with, but more narrow 
than, that of model one which found that as Per Capita GDP increases, countries are increasingly 
likely to adopt anti-status quo strategies the following year. 
                                                          
79 Trubowitz, Peter. 2011. Politics and Strategy: Partisan Ambition and American Statecraft. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. Kindle Edition Location 622-671. 
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Notes:      
**Base Economic System was Liberal 
Underline = more likely strategy choice 
 
Data derived from: 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press, 
 
Maddison, Angus (2006) The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and Volume 2 
Historical Statistics. OECD Development Centre, 
 
Looking at the economic system variables, we can see that holding all other factors 
constant, a Primarily Marxist Economy is 10,000 times more likely to be Legalist than 
Revisionist, compared to Primarily Liberal Economies. However, Primarily Mercantilist 
Economies, while 405% more likely to be Legalist than Interventionist, are approximately 100% 
less likely to be Legalist than Revisionist compared to primarily Liberal Economies, holding all 
 
Table 5a2: Model 3; Statistically Significant Effects of Economic Variables on 
Grand Strategy Choice the Following Year 
 
 
Coefficient Z Score P > |z| % Change 
Relative GDP     
Legalist vs. Revisionist -4.25 -4.801 0.000 -98.6 
Relative GDP Per Capita     
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 5.87 2.097 0.036 35313.8 
Primarily Marxist Economy     
Legalist vs. Revisionist 9.23 2.389 0.017 1.0x10^6 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -9.21 -1.799 0.072 -100.0 
Primarily Mercantilist Economy     
Legalist vs. Interventionist 1.62 1.890 0.059 404.8 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -10.78 -12.579 0.000 -100.0 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -1.62 -1.890 0.059 -80.2 
Number of Observations 366  
Pseudo R-squared 0.6789  
Pseudo Log Likelihood -145.63  
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other factors constant. These effects were statistically significant at the 10% level or better for 
the two tailed test. This means that nations with a primarily Mercantilist Economy are more 
likely to choose a Legalist rather than Interventionist Strategy, and are even more likely to 
choose a Revisionist rather than Legalist Grand Strategy. 
Moving on to political variables (given in Table 5a3 below), compared to Monarchies, 
Presidential Democracies are 270,000 times more likely to adopt a Legalist, as opposed to 
Revisionist, Grand Strategy, holding all other factors constant. More importantly, when 
compared to Monarchies, Presidential Democracies are far more likely to adopt an Isolationist 
Grand Strategy, for example they are 5.6 x 10^19 times more likely to choose an Isolationist as 
opposed to Legalist strategy, are 7.5 x 10^18 times more likely to choose an Isolationist rather 
than Interventionist strategy and 1.5 x 10^25 times more likely to choose an Isolationist rather 
than Revisionist Grand Strategy, holding all other factors constant. Taken together, this means 
that Presidential Democracies are far more likely to choose a low risk strategy and an Isolationist 
Strategy in particular, than are Monarchies. This tracks with the results of model 2 which 
indicated that Presidential Democracies are more likely to choose low risk strategies compared to 
Monarchies. 
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Notes:      
*Base Government Type was Monarchy, 
Underline = more likely strategy choice 
 
Data derived from: 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ 
Press, 
 
Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
 
 
 
Table 5a3: Model 3; Statistically Significant Effects of Political Variables on 
Grand Strategy Choice the Following Year 
 
 
Coefficient Z Score P > |z| % Change 
Presidential Democracy     
Legalist vs. Isolationist -45.47 -3.808 0.000 -100 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 12.49 4.327 0.000 2.7x10^7 
Isolationist vs. Legalist 45.47 3.808 0.000 5.6x10^21 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist 43.46 3.381 0.001 7.5x10^20 
Isolationist vs Revisionist 57.96 4.509 0.000 1.5x10^27 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist -43.46 -3.381 0.001 -100.0 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist -57.96 -5.838 0.000 -100.0 
Parliamentary Democracy     
Legalist vs. Interventionist -5.31 -4.408 0.000 -99.5 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 5.31 4.408 0.000 20139.7 
Dictatorship     
Legalist vs. Revisionist -10.68 -7.004 0.000 -100.0 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 10.68 2.576 0.010 4.4x10^6 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist 9.01 2.182 0.029 819109.0 
Polity 2 Score     
Legalist vs. Revisionist 0.32 2.359 0.018 38.3 
Number of Observations 366  
Pseudo R-squared 0.6789  
Pseudo Log Likelihood -145.63  
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Looking at other government forms, when compared to Monarchies, the odds of 
Parliamentary Democracies being Interventionist, as opposed to Legalist, increase by a factor of 
202. On the other hand, for Dictatorships, the odds of being Revisionist rather than Legalist are 
increased by a factor of 44,000, and the odds of being Revisionist versus Interventionist are 
higher by a factor of 8,192, holding all other factors constant. These results are in line with those 
of model 2 which indicated that when compared to Monarchies, Dictatorships tended to assume a 
much higher Risk of Major War the following year. The last political variable, Polity 2 Score is a 
little different, with a one unit increase in Polity 2 Score increasing the odds of a country being 
Legalist as opposed to Revisionist by 38.3%, holding all other factors constant. Finally, these 
results were statistically significant at the .05 level or better. 
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Notes:      
*Base Government Type was Monarchy, **Base Economic System was Liberal 
Underline = more likely strategy choice 
 
Data derived from: 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ 
Press, 
 
 
 
Table 5a4: Model 3; Statistically Significant Effects of Other Variables on Grand 
Strategy Choice the Following Year 
 
 
Coefficient Z Score P > |z| % Change 
Homeland Vulnerability     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 10.57 2.779 0.005 3.9x10^6 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 3.52 3.639 0.000 3281.3 
Isolationist vs. Legalist -10.57 -2.779 0.005 -100.0 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist -10.47 -3.224 0.001 -100.0 
Isolationist vs Revisionist -7.05 -2.171 0.030 -99.9 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 10.47 3.224 0.001 3.5x10^6 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -3.52 -3.703 0.000 -97.0 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 7.05 2.183 0.029 115436.3 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist -3.42 -5.938 0.000 -96.7 
Nation Age     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 0.2162 1.952 0.051 24.1 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 0.09 7.634 0.000 9.3 
Isolationist vs. Legalist -0.22 -1.95 0.051 -19.4 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist -0.22 -2.073 0.038 -19.9 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 0.22 2.073 0.038 24.8 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 0.13 1.956 0.050 13.6 
Number of Observations 366  
Pseudo R-squared 0.6789  
Pseudo Log Likelihood -145.63  
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Moving on to the last two variables (in Table 5a4 above), starting with Homeland 
Vulnerability, we see that it had several effects which were statistically significant at the .05 
level or better for the two-tailed test. First, holding all other factors constant, a one-unit increase 
in Homeland Vulnerability reduces the odds of a state choosing an Isolationist strategy by at 
least 99.9% versus the other three grand strategy choices. For example, a one-unit increase in 
Homeland Vulnerability increases the odds of a nation choosing a Legalist, as opposed to 
Isolationist Grand Strategy by a factor of 39,000; an Interventionist versus Isolationist strategy 
by a factor of 35,000, and the odds of a Revisionist vs. an Isolationist Grand Strategy by a factor 
of 1,155, holding all other variables constant. Secondly, looking at the effects of increased 
Homeland Vulnerability on whether a country chooses to adopt a Revisionist Grand Strategy, we 
see that a one-unit increase reduces the odds a country will adopt a Revisionist vs. Legalist 
Grand Strategy by 97% and reduces the odds of a Revisionist as opposed to Interventionist 
Grand Strategy by 96.7%. Taken all together, this means that as Homeland Vulnerability 
increases nations are more likely to choose Revisionist over Isolationist Strategies, but they are 
even more likely to adopt pro status quo strategies than either an Isolationist or a Revisionist 
Policy. This is very much in line with the results of the first two models, which indicated that as 
Homeland Vulnerability increases countries are more likely to adopt Pro Status-Quo Strategies 
and are willing to accept a higher Risk of Major War the following year. 
Finally, looking at Nation Age, a one-unit increase corresponds to a 24.1% increase in the 
odds of being Legalist as opposed to Isolationist and a 9.3% increase in the odds of being 
Legalist as opposed to Revisionist, holding all other variables constant. Furthermore, a one unit 
increase in Nation Age increases the odds of a nation adopting an Interventionist strategy rather 
than Isolationist strategy by 24.8% and Revisionist instead of Isolationist by 13.6%. This means 
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that as great powers age they tend to be increasingly pro status quo generally and are especially 
less likely to become isolationist and withdraw from playing any role in the international system. 
These results are in line with both previous models. Furthermore, all of the above results were 
significant at the 5% level or better for the two-tailed test. 
To get a better idea of how well the multinomial model can predict a great power’s 
choice of grand strategy, Figure 1 (below) compares the Model’s Predicted Grand Strategy 
Choice with the Observed Grand Strategy Choice Variable (the Dependent Variable Model 3 
was attempting to predict). As we can see from the Figure 1 and the accompanying table (see 
below), the model successfully predicted a nations choice of grand strategy in some 310 out of 
356 observed cases, or about 87% of the time. 
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Figure 1: Twoway Jittered Scatter of Predicted
61 
 
 Predicted Grand Strategy:  
Observed: Legalist Isolationist Interventionist Revisionist Total: 
Legalist 39 0 11 6 56 
Isolationist 1 28 0 3 32 
Interventionist 12 0 146 2 160 
Revisionist 1 5 5 97 108 
Total: 53 33 162 108 356 
 
In conclusion, while the models used in this study represent only an initial quantitative 
examination of the relationship between relative military and economic power and grand strategy 
choice, and are limited only to modern great powers, there is substantial agreement between the 
statistically significant effects of the three models, with the third model providing the most 
nuanced view of the relationship between the independent variables tested and Grand Strategy 
Choice. In the future, the goal would be to improve and expand these models not only to cover a 
wider array of potential explanations and greater sample size, but also to cover regional and 
lesser powers with their more complex interactions and issues. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Detailed Analysis of Model 3 Predictions for The United States: 1892-1992 
 
This chapter will attempt to clarify how the complex interactions of Model 3 work 
together in a real world historical example. Figure 2 (below), shows the Model 3 predictions 
based on the prior year’s data for the United States for the years covered by the dataset. The 
United States was chosen for more in-depth analysis because it has the most complete data 
available (it has data for every variable for all 100 years the data set covers) and because it is the 
most difficult country for the model to successfully predict (Model 3 only successfully predicts 
the observed grand strategy for the U.S. about 78% of the time, compared to an average of 87%).  
 
As we can see from Figure 1 above, prior to 1902 the model broadly predicts that the 
U.S. will adopt an Isolationist Grand Strategy.  On the other hand, after 1902 the model predicts 
the U.S. will adopt either an Interventionist or a Legalist Grand Strategy, depending largely on 
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changes in the relative power variables (as the structural variables change little during this 
period, apart from time variables such as nation age). However, while the Model 3 predictions 
are broadly consistent with the way U.S. foreign policy has been described during this period,80 a 
great deal more of the strengths and weaknesses of the model can be seen by looking at its 
predictions in more detail and comparing these predictions with a timeline of major U.S. foreign 
policy events.  
The Figures below (3A-3D) give the Model 3 predictions for U.S. Grand Strategy Choice 
from the Year 1892 to 1992 superimposed over a timeline of 110 important U.S. foreign policy 
actions and events. Each of the sub figures covers a twenty-five-year period and the numbers on 
each figure are colored to represent the strategy choice with which they are most consistent, with 
bold numbers indicating a major war, and black numbers indicating either that there are multiple 
consistent strategies or that the event does not directly relate to another great power (and thus 
would not be included in the current model as it only predicts strategies relating to other great 
powers). Below each figure is a numbered list of the included foreign policy events and the year 
they occurred. 
                                                          
80 See: Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New York: Oxford 
University Press.; Kennedy, Paul. 1991. Grand Strategies in War and Peace. New Haven: Yale. pp.171-172.; La 
Faber, Walter. 2012. “The U.S. Rise to World Power, 1776-1945. ” and Saul, Richard. 2012. “American Policy During 
the Cold War.” In US Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Cox and Doug Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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Major U.S. Foreign Policy Actions:81 
1. Lifting of Brazilian Blockade (1894) 
2. Dispute over British Guiana (1894) 
3. Spanish American War (1898) 
4. Open Door Note I (1899)  
5. Boxer Rebellion (1900) 
6. Open Door Note II (1900) 
7. Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine 
(1904)  
8.  Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) 
9.  Great White Fleet (1907) 
10.  Dollar Diplomacy (1907-1913) 
11.  Occupation of Veracruz (1914) 
12.  Punitive Expedition to Mexico (1916-1917) 
13.  National Defense Act of June 1916 
14.  U.S. Participation in World War 1 (1917-
1918) 
As we can see from Figure 3-A (above), Model 3 predicts that the U.S. will pursue an 
Isolationist grand strategy prior to 1901, and then a shift to a more pro status quo grand strategy 
(either Interventionist or Legalist) thereafter. While for the most part historical events are 
consistent with the models predictions, one area which appears to be an exception is the group of 
revisionist events leading up to the Spanish American War. However, it is important to note that 
                                                          
81 Events taken from: Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
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these actions, the Lifting of the Brazilian Blockade (1894), the Dispute over British Guiana 
(1894) and the Spanish American War (1898) all involve actions attempting to limit or remove 
the influence of other great powers within the Western Hemisphere, an area that has been an 
exception to the traditionally isolationist grand strategy of the United States going back to the 
creation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823.82  
Therefore, the revisionist actions taken by the United States in South and Central 
America in the late 1800’s do not necessarily indicate that the U.S. is taking a revisionist 
approach to foreign policy generally, especially with respect to the other great powers in areas 
outside of the western hemisphere. Furthermore, the lack of any significant foreign policy events 
outside of the western hemisphere during this period is consistent with an overall Isolationist 
Grand Strategy as predicted by the model. Thus, the Monroe doctrine is perhaps best 
characterized as a sub strategy rather than the type of overall grand strategy that Model 3 is 
attempting to predict. Looking at the rest of this period, the model does a good job of predicting 
the shift to a more active, and pro status quo, foreign policy envisioned by American 
progressives beginning with President Theodore Roosevelt’s administration following President 
McKinley’s assassination in 1901.83 84 
                                                          
82 La Faber, Walter. 2012. “The U.S. Rise to World Power, 1776-1945. ” In US Foreign Policy, ed. Michael Cox and 
Doug Stokes. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pg.46 
 
83 Ibid. pp. 49. 
 
84 Zelizer, Julian E.2009. Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on 
Terrorism. New York: Basic Books. Pg. 19 
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Major U.S. Foreign Policy Actions:85 
15. Allied Intervention in Russia (1918-1919) 
16. Washington Naval Conference (1921-1922) 
17. Dawes Plan (1924) 
18. Locarno Conference (1925) 
19. Kellog-Briand Pact Outlawing War (1928) 
20. Young Plan / BIS (1929) 
21. Great Depression Begins (1929) 
22. London Naval Conference (1930) 
23. Stimson Doctrine (1932) 
24. Roosevelt’s Rejection of London 
Conference Agreement (1933) 
25. Recognition of the USSR (1933) 
26. Montevideo Conference (1933) 
27. 1935 Neutrality Act 
28. 1936 Neutrality Act 
29. 1937 Neutrality Act (added Cash and Carry) 
30. 1939 Neutrality Act (Repeals Embargo on 
Arms Sales, Extends Cash and Carry) 
31. 1940 Defense Appropriations 
32. Destroyers for Bases (1940) 
33. Lend-Lease (1940) 
34. The Act of Havana (1940) 
35. Good Neighbor Policy Expansion (1940) 
36. Limited Embargo on Japan (1940) 
37. Atlantic Charter (1941) 
38. Greer Incident, Convoy Protection and 
Repeal of the Neutrality Acts (1941) 
39. Full Embargo of Japan (1941) 
40. Attack on Pearl Harbor (U.S. in W.W. II 
1941-1945) 
 
                                                          
85 Events taken from: Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
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Figure 3-B (Above) covers the period from 1917-1942. Overall, throughout the interwar 
period the model predicts that the U.S. will assume a Legalist Grand Strategy, and this prediction 
is consistent with most of the observed foreign policy actions and events during this period. 
However, there are two notable exceptions, the first is the group of Isolationist foreign policy 
actions spanning from 1933 to 1937, and the other is large cluster of Interventionist foreign 
policy actions beginning in 1940. The Isolationist events began with President Franklin 
Roosevelt rejecting the London Conference Agreement of 1933 and continued with the 1935-
1937 Neutrality acts, before coming to an end with the passage of the 1939 Neutrality Act.  
This period is interesting because, while the model predicts that the United States would 
adopt a more pro status quo foreign policy, it adopted an isolationist strategy instead. This 
adoption of an Isolationist Grand Strategy would cause the United States to avoid taking a 
leading role during this volatile period, something that the U.S. has been heavily criticized for, 
and a failure which may have help to contribute to the outbreak of World War II. 86 This failure 
may also explain the later cluster of unpredicted Interventionist actions in 1940 and 1941 as the 
United States attempts to reverse its Isolationist course at the last minute and prepare for the 
possibility of intervening in World War II. This interventionist shift defies the Model’s 
expectations primarily because the U.S. had been left behind militarily by the other great powers, 
which made embarking on an Interventionist Policy far less likely. For example, in 1932, 
military expenditures in the United States amounted to 81% of the mean for military 
                                                          
86 See: Kennedy, Paul. 1989. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Changes and Military Conflict from 
1500 to 2000. New York: Vintage Books. Kindle Edition. Loc.7160 - 7261 
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expenditures for great powers for that year, while by 1940 the United States spent only 21% of 
the mean for great powers for that year.87 
 Figure 3-C (Below) covers the twenty-five-year period from 1942 to 1967, and overall 
the Model 3 predictions follow very closely with the observed foreign policy actions for this 
period, with the clear majority of policy actions following the most likely predicted Grand 
Strategy Choice. The primary exceptions to this are the U.S. response to the Soviet-Turkish 
Crisis of 1946, and a series of Legalist actions taken in the middle east in the 1950’s and 60’s.  
The Turkish Crisis of 1946 represents the end of post war cooperation between the 
U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. and the beginning of the Cold War, while the legalist events in the 
1950’s and 60’s represent efforts by the U.S. to either strengthen or mediate between 
governments in South America and the Middle East in an effort to avoid conflict and promote 
those states ability to resist communist influence without requiring direct U.S. military 
intervention.88 Thus, while these events are primarily legalist in nature, they in no way conflict 
with an Interventionist Grand Strategy overall and instead represent another example of the U.S. 
employing a sub strategy different from the overall grand strategy the U.S. pursues. Statistically, 
this period represents the time frame in which the model was best able to predict U.S. Foreign 
policy actions, and this is not surprising as the model is primarily realist in nature and this period 
is the one in which U.S. politics most closely resembles the realist ideal.89 
                                                          
87 Data Derived from: Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. 
Washington DC: CQ Press 
 
88 Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New York: Oxford 
University Press. pp. 670-678. 
 
89 Zelizer, Julian E.2009. Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on 
Terrorism. New York: Basic Books. Pg. 67-203 
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Major U.S. Foreign Policy Actions:90 
41. Bretton Woods / World Bank / IMF (1944) 
42. Yalta Conference (1945) 
43. UN Charter Approved (1945) 
44. Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting in 
Moscow (1945) 
45. Soviet-Turkish Crisis (1946) 
46. National Security Act of July 1947 (creates 
CIA) 
47. Truman Doctrine / Military Aid to Greece and 
Turkey (1947) 
48. Operation Rollback (1947) 
49. The Rio Pact (1947) 
50. The Marshall Plan (1948) 
51. CIA intervention in Italian Elections (1948) 
52. The Berlin Airlift (1948-1949) 
53. The Treaty of Washington (Creates NATO, 
1949) 
54. Mutual Defense Assistance Act (1949) 
55. Korean War (1950-1953) 
56. Implementation of NSC 68 (1950) 
57. Four Point Program (1950) 
58. ‘Campaign for Truth’ begins (1950)  
59. U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty (1951) 
60. New Look / NSC-162/2 (1953) 
61. U.S.-South Korea Defense Treaty (1953) 
62. Project Ajax (US/British led Iranian Coup, 
1953) 
63. South East Asia Treaty Organization (1954) 
64. Nine Powers Conference (1954) 
65. Baghdad Pact (1954) 
66. Taiwan Straights Crisis / Formosa Resolution 
(1954-1955) 
67. U.S.-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty (1955) 
68. Suez Crisis (1956) 
69. Eisenhower Doctrine in Mideast with 
interventions in Jordan, Lebanon and Syria 
(1956-1958) 
70. Bay of Pigs (1961) 
71. Alliance for Progress (1961) 
72. Cuban Missile Crisis (1962) 
73. Tonkin Gulf Resolution / Vietnam War 
(1964) 
74. US Mediation in Six Day War (1967) 
                                                          
90 Events taken from: Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
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 Finally, Figure 3-D (below) covers the years between 1967 and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union in 1992. During this period, Model 3 predicts the United states will pursue a 
primarily Interventionist Grand Strategy with a Legalist Strategy being the next most likely 
outcome. Overall, these predictions were broadly consistent with the observed foreign policy 
actions. The major exception to this was the cluster of Legalist events spanning from 1968 
through 1975 which collectively represent they policy of détente towards Russia and China and 
the attempts to limit nuclear weapons begun by President Johnson and continued under President 
Nixon. 91 This was a brief but significant shift in U.S. policy away from Interventionism and 
towards Legalism, which shows the limitations of the model’s ability to capture non-rational 
influences like in this case the psychological backlash against Interventionism resulting from the 
U.S. experience in the Vietnam War.92 However, over time these psychological stresses dissipate 
and in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Carter returns the U.S. to the primarily 
Interventionist Grand Strategy predicted by the model.93 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
91 Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New York: Oxford 
University Press. pp. 760-765. 
 
92 Zelizer, Julian E.2009. Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security from World War II to the War on 
Terrorism. New York: Basic Books. Pg. 237-272 
 
93 Ibid at 850-855. 
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Major U.S. Foreign Policy Actions:94 
75. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1968) 
76. U.S. Incursion into Cambodia (1970) 
77. Termination of Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (1970) 
78. U.S. Undermining of Allende Government (1970-
1973) 
79. Kissinger’s Visit to Beijing (1971) 
80. Four Power Agreement on Berlin (1971) 
81. Nixon’s Visit to China (1972) 
82. Détente, Moscow Summit, ABM and SALT I 
Agreements (1972) 
83. U.S. Military Withdraws from South Vietnam 
(1973) 
84. Yom Kippur War (1973) 
85. Invasion of Koh Tang Island (1975) 
86. Angola Civil War (1975) 
87. Helsinki Summit (1975) 
88. U.S. Support of Zaire (1977-1978) 
89. Panama Canal Treaty (1978) 
90. Normalization of U.S.-China Relations (1979) 
91. Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan / U.S. aid to Afghan 
Rebels / Sanctions on USSR (1979) 
92. ‘Carter Doctrine’ (1979) 
93. Presidential Directive 59 (1980) 
94. Failed Iran Hostage Rescue (1980) 
95. ‘Regan Doctrine’ (1980) 
96. US Sanctions Poland and USSR (1981) 
97. Gulf of Sidra Incident (1981) 
98. National Security Decision Directive 75 (1982) 
99. CIA Operations in Support of Nicaraguan Contras 
(1982-1988) 
100. U.S. Intervention in Lebanon (1982-84, 1986) 
101. U.S. Invasion of Grenada (1983) 
102. U.S. Military Aid to El Salvador (1984) 
103. Massive Escalation of U.S. Aid to Afghan Rebels 
(1985-1989) 
104. Iran-Contra Affair (1986) 
105. Reykjavik Summit on Strategic Arms Limitation 
(1986) 
106. INF Treaty (1987) 
107. Reunification of Germany (1990) 
108. Operation Desert Storm (1991) 
109. START Treaty (1991) 
110. Soviet Union Collapses (1991) 
                                                          
94 Events taken from: Herring, George C. 2008. From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
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Overall, looking the last hundred years of American foreign policy presented in this 
chapter, two things are clear: the first is that U.S. policy during this period is not formulated 
randomly and, that with some significant exceptions, it follows a rational and thus predictable 
approach. One based not only on relative power variables, but also structural variables and other 
societal influences. Furthermore, which set of factors; Rational, Relative, Structural, or Social, is 
driving policy will vary at any given time. We also see that for most of its recent history (with 
the prominent exception of the isolationist policies of the early 1930’s), the United States has 
pursued a combination of Interventionist and Legalist Grand Strategies. This provides support 
for structurally limited rational models like Collen Dueck’s “Strategic Culture”95 and describes 
U.S. strategy formation during the majority of the time, when the U.S. is operating in a ‘rational’ 
policy mode. Understanding those periods where the U.S. deviates from rational policy 
formation will take significant future research and is beyond the scope of this paper. 
  
                                                          
95 Dueck, Colin. 2006. Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, Kindle Edition, pp. 13-35 
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Chapter 7 
Overview of Remaining Model 3 Predictions: 
This next chapter will provide a summary of the Model 3 predictions for Grand Strategy 
Choice for the remaining great powers in the data set in order of agreement between Model 3’s 
predictions and the Observed Grand Strategy Choice Variable. Of these remaining powers, the 
nation whose grand strategy was most difficult for Model 3 to predict was Imperial Japan, with 
the model successfully predicting the observed strategy approximately 82.5% of the time, when 
compared to the Observed Grand Strategy Choice variable.96 While the nation with the greatest 
agreement between Model 3’s predictions and the Observed Grand Strategy was Nazi Germany 
with Model 3 successfully predicting Nazi Germany’s Grand Strategy choice 100% of the time.  
Model 3’s predictions for Imperial Japan are plotted in Figure 4 (below) which covers the 
period during which Japan was a great power.  Looking at Figure 4 we can see that from the time 
Imperial Japan assumes the status of a great power, until its destruction at the end of World War 
II, its grand strategy is torn between Isolationist and Revisionist tendencies, often alternating 
between the two. This conflict in strategic approach may have been the result of the continuing 
power struggle between the Japanese Foreign Ministry and Japanese Military for control of 
Imperial Japan’s foreign policy.97  
 
                                                          
96 See Appendix Table A3 for complete list of Observed Grand Strategies and  Model 3 Predictions 
97 Nish, Ian. 1977. Japanese Foreign Policy, 1869-1942. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
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Continuing on, Model 3 predicted 84% of the observed grand strategies for the next two 
great powers, Imperial Germany (Figure 5 below) and Austria Hungary (Figure 6 below); both of 
these powers came to an end after World War 1 although Nazi Germany (which was treated as a 
separate power due to the change in government) would briefly recapture great power status and 
is discussed later. Looking at the Model 3 predictions for Imperial Germany (Figure 5 below), 
we can see that the model predicts Imperial Germany will follow a revisionist grand strategy 
from the beginning of period covered by the data and extending until its demise at the end of 
World War 1, with the greatest probability of Imperial Germany following an alternate Legalist 
strategy occurring in 1917.  
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Moving on to the Model predictions for Austria-Hungary (Figure 6 above), we can see 
that Model 3 predicts that Austria Hungary will follow a predominantly Legalist Grand Strategy 
until 1914, the year Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand is assassinated, and then switch to an 
Interventionist Grand Strategy thereafter, which is broadly consistent with Austria-Hungary’s 
view of their strategy during this period.98 Keep in mind that while other powers viewed Austria-
Hungary’s invasion of Serbia as upsetting the status quo, from the Austria-Hungarian 
perspective, they were attempting to maintain the status quo in the Balkans.99 Austria-Hungary is 
also interesting because while it was a monarchy it was also for much of its history the definition 
of a legalist state100, something which we tend to associate more with modern democracies than 
with monarchies.  
                                                          
98 See: Bridge, F.R. 1972. From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914. London: 
Routledge. pp. 310-389 
 
99 Ibid. pp. 380-389 
 
100 Ibid. 
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Next is France (Figure 7 above ), with an 87.2% agreement between the Observed Grand 
Strategies and the Model 3 Predictions, we can see that except for a brief period at the beginning 
of the period covered by the sample, France was predicted to follow a predominantly 
Interventionist Grand Strategy and for the most part these predictions closely follow the 
Observed Grand Strategy of France during the covered period.101 Although Model 3 slightly 
favors an Interventionist policy between 1892 to 1899, the observed policy of France was 
Revisionist throughout this period, only switching to Interventionist after a change in 
administration in 1899.102  This indicates one of the constraints in relating the models predictions 
to real life, often even though the realities underlying a grand strategy may have changed 
                                                          
101 See: Nere, J. 1975. The Foreign Policy of France from 1914 to 1945. London: Routledge. 
 
102 See: Mayeur, Jean-Marie and Madeleine Reberioux. 1984. The Third Republic From its Origins to The Great War 
1871-1914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. and, Philippe Bernard and Henri Dubief. 1985. The Decline of 
the Third Republic: 1914-1938. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
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(making a change likely), it often takes a change of administration for a new grand strategy to 
manifest. 
 
Turning to the models predictions for the Soviet Union (given in Figure 8 above) we can 
see that for much of its history Soviet Russia consistently pursued a Revisionist Grand Strategy. 
Although Model 3 indicates that there may be some shift in strategy beginning as early as 1980 
and becoming increasing likely throughout the decade. This comports well with the Observed 
Grand Strategies which have Soviet Russia shifting from a Revisionist to Legalist Strategy 
beginning in 1988 and even becoming Interventionist in 1991 right before the final collapse of 
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the Soviet Union.103 Finally, Model 3 also included some data for Imperial Russia, but there was 
too much missing data for the associated predictions to make a meaningful timeline.104 
 
Figure 9 (above) gives the Model 3 predictions for the United Kingdom from the 
beginning of the period covered by the study and continuing until its loss of great power status 
towards the end of the 1940’s. Throughout this period the model predicts that United Kingdom 
will follow an Interventionist Grand Strategy and this agrees perfectly with the Observed Grand 
Strategies, but with one exception: in 1937 the observed grand strategy was Legalist rather than 
Interventionist.105 Taken together it is interesting to note that all three of democracies examined, 
especially Great Britain and France (both parliamentary democracies) heavily favored 
                                                          
103 See: Donaldson, Robert H., Joseph L. Nogee and Vidya Nadkarni. 2015. The Foreign Policy of Russia: Changing 
Systems, Enduring Interests, 5thed. London: Routledge. Kindle Edition. 
 
104 For the Model 3 predictions for which there was sufficient data, please see Table A3 in the appendix. In the case 
of Imperial Russia most of the missing data was economic. 
105 See: Bartlett, C. J. 1989. British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century. London: Macmillian 
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Interventionist Grand Strategies, something borne out by both Model 3 and its associated 
Predictions. 
 
 Finally, the Observed Grand Strategy of the last Great Power examined in the data set, 
Nazi Germany, was perfectly predicted by Model 3. The Model 3 predictions for Nazi Germany 
are given in Table 10 (above). It is perhaps of no surprise that throughout its brief existence as a 
great power, Nazi Germany was predicted to follow a Revisionist Grand Strategy.106 What is 
surprising is that Model 3 gives the probability that Nazi Germany will engage in a Revisionist 
Grand Strategy as nearly 100% as early as 1936 (three years before the invasion of Poland), and 
makes this prediction using data from 1935. This is a great example of the potential utility of a 
statistical model of Grand Strategy Choice not only because it could provide warning that a state 
is adopting a revisionist strategy in advance, but also because it can indicate that there were 
                                                          
106 Hildebrand, Klaus. 1989. German Foreign Policy from Bismarck to Adenauer: The Limits of Statecraft. Abindon: 
Routledge. 
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significant underlying structural and relative power factors which were pushing Germany 
towards adopting a Revisionist Grand Strategy. 
 This chapter provides the Model 3 predictions for the other great powers included in the 
study and in doing so demonstrates one of the primary advantages of this kind of quantitative 
research, namely the ability of a single model based on empirical data to be able to predict a 
great deal (although by no means all) of great power behavior, even though there are clear 
differences in the specific approaches adopted by each great power. Of particular interest to this 
study’s overall goals is the success Model 3 has at predicting the revisionist behavior of Nazi 
Germany and other revisionist states. 
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Chapter 8 
Conclusion: 
This research was intended as an initial step toward determining what role, if any, relative 
military and economic strength plays in grand strategy choice. More specifically it asks the 
question: do relative military and economic power determine strategy choice? To put it simply 
the answer to this question is yes, military and economic variables help determine grand strategy 
choice, but these are by no means the only variables which play a roll, as structural and other 
variables do so as well. 
 To answer this question this study used three statistical models, a multivariate logistic 
regression model (Model 1), a multivariate ordinary least squares model (Model 2) and a time 
series multinomial logit model (Model 3). The first hypothesis (𝐻1) was that as Relative 
Economic Power increases, countries will have a higher probability of choosing Pro Status Quo 
strategies (Interventionism and Legalism). This hypothesis was directly addressed by Model 1, 
which did not find any statistically significant link between Relative Economic Power (either in 
terms of Relative GDP or Relative Per Capita GDP) and whether a nation adopted a Pro or Anti 
Status Quo Grand Strategy the following year. However, Model 1 did find that Relative Military 
Expenditures Per Military Personnel had both a statistical and structurally significant effect on 
the odds of a nation adopting an Anti-Status Quo Grand Strategy the following year; with a one 
unit increase in Relative Military Expenditures per Military Personnel increasing the odds of 
pursuing an Anti-Status Quo Grand Strategy the following year by a factor of 11.9. Looking at 
the implications of this result for the other theories examined, the effect of Relative Military 
Expenditures per Personnel provides statistical evidence for the operation of some form of 
offense – defense balance and corresponding security dilemma, as proposed by Robert Jervis. In 
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particular, Model 1 indicates a strong link between the way a great power’s military is 
configured (with regard to high or low Expenditures per Personnel) and whether a power will 
pursue Pro or Anti Status Quo strategy the following year. 107   
Looking at the Model 1 implications for other related theories, a one unit increase in a 
Great Powers age corresponded to a 15% reduction in the odds of choosing an anti-status quo 
strategy the following year. This provides support for Organski and Kugler’s conclusions in The 
War Ledger, as younger, rising powers were statistically and substantively more likely to 
implement Anti-status Quo Grand Strategies compared to older, more established great 
powers.108 Finally, looking at Model 1’s implications for democratic peace theory, the Model 
found that Parliamentary Democracies were 99.9 percent more likely to choose a pro status quo 
policy the following year than Monarchies, with all other factors being equal, while the evidence 
was less clear for Presidential Democracies. Still, this provides further statistical support for 
democratic peace Theory.109 
Moving on to Model 2, my second hypothesis (𝐻2) was that as Relative Military Power 
increases, countries are more likely to choose High Risk strategies (namely Interventionism or 
Revisionism). This Hypothesis was directly tested by Model 2 which found that while the 
Relative Military Power variables (except for Relative Military Personnel) were statistically 
significant predictors of how much Risk of Major War a great power would assume the 
                                                          
107 Jervis, Robert. (1978). “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics, Vol.30, No.2 (January 1978). 
pp. 186-214 
 
108 Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition 
Loc. 3082. 
 
109 Ray, James Lee. 1995. Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition. 
Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
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following year; their effects were opposed.  Model 2 found that increases in Relative 
Expenditures per Military Personnel corresponded to a greater Risk of Major War the following 
year, but increases in overall Relative Military Expenditures had the opposite effect, reducing the 
Risk of War. However, while the effects of the Relative Military Power Variables were 
somewhat ambiguous, the effects of the Relative Economic Power Variables were not. Both 
Relative Economic Power variables were statistically and substantively significant, and both 
linked increased Relative Economic Power to greater Risk of Major War the following year. This 
lead to the unexpected result that the most influential relative power variables in each model 
were switched from what the hypotheses predicted; with Relative Military Power influencing 
whether a nation will be Pro vs. Anti-Status quo and Relative Economic Power increasing the 
Risk of Major War a great power is prepared to accept. 
Looking at Model 2’s implications for other theories, starting with offensive Realism, we 
can see that the results are mixed.  While the positive link between the Relative Economic Power 
variables and Risk of Major War support the theory, the negative relationship between increased 
Relative Military Expenditures and Risk argues against it. Far less ambiguous is Model 2’s 
support for the effect of some sort of offense-defense balance operating in great power politics, 
with a clear link between higher Relative Expenditures per Military Personnel and an increased 
Risk of Major War the following year. Similarly, the positive relationship between increased 
economic power and increased Risk of Major War, provides strong support for Organski and 
Kugler’s conclusion that hegemonic wars are likely to occur when a rising power overtakes the 
power of the dominant nation.110 Finally, Model 2 provides strong substantive and statistically 
                                                          
110 Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition at 
Loc. 3082. 
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significant support for democratic peace theory with both Presidential Democracies and 
Parliamentary Democracies being associated with reduced Risk of Major War. 
Examining Model 3, we can see that the effect of Relative Military power on Grand 
Strategy Choice is very complex, with increases in either Relative Expenditures Per Personnel or 
Relative Number of Military Personnel increasing the odds that a great power will choose a non-
Legalist Grand Strategy. This tendency is somewhat offset by the positive relationship between 
overall Relative Military Expenditures and pursuing a Legalist Grand Strategy. Furthermore, 
when these military variables come into conflict, the effect of the Relative Number Military 
Personnel is likely to dominate the other two, providing some additional evidence that force 
structure may have a significant impact on strategy choice, as one would expect from Jervis’s 
offense-defense balance. 111  
Looking at the impact of the economic variables, we see that both show a positive 
relationship between greater economic strength and the adoption of a Revisionist Grand Strategy, 
providing some evidence for ‘offensive realism’ but one tempered by the positive relationship 
between increased Relative Military Expenditures and following a Legalist Grand Strategy the 
next year. On the other hand, the effects of the relative economic variables provide clear support 
for Organski and Kugler’s theory that a rising power is more likely to adopt a Revisionist Grand 
Strategy. Furthermore, the type of economy within which one operates matters. For example, 
Mercantilist Economies have a very strong propensity for pursuing Revisionist Grand Strategies. 
                                                          
111 Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics, Vol.30, No.2 (January 1978). 
pp. 186-214 
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Moving on to an examination of the political variables in Model 3, there is some 
significant support for the Democratic Peace Theory. With Presidential democracies strongly 
preferring Low Risk strategies (Isolationism and Legalism) when compared to Monarchies, and 
Parliamentary Democracies favoring Interventionist Grand Strategies over Legalist ones. Next, 
Dictatorship had the opposite effect, strongly favoring Revisionist Grand Strategies, when 
compared to Monarchies, all other factors being equal. Furthermore, as Polity 2 score increases 
we see an increasing preference for Legalist over Revisionist Grand Strategies. 
Finally, we see that both Homeland Vulnerability and Nation Age had statistically and 
substantively significant effects, with both acting to increase the odds a great power will follow a 
Legalist Grand Strategy the following year. The link between Nation Age and Legalist Grand 
Strategies provides additional support for both Organski and Kugler’s arguments about the role 
of younger powers in major wars. 112 While the effects of Homeland Vulnerability provides clear 
evidence for the existence of some form of Robert Jervis’s ‘Security Dilemma.’113 
Examining the overall results of all of the models taken together, this study concludes 
that both relative military and relative economic power have significant effects on Grand 
Strategy Choice; however, they are far from the only variables which do so. Structural variables 
such as Government Type, Homeland Vulnerability, and others were also statistically significant 
predictors of strategy choice. In addition, the effects of relative military power in particular, were 
more nuanced than initially expected. Thus, Model 3 provides important evidence in favor of the 
                                                          
112 Organski, A.F.K. and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kindle Edition at 
Loc. 3082. 
 
113 Jervis, Robert. 1978. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics, Vol.30, No.2 (January 1978). 
pp. 186-214 
 
87 
 
hybrid theories of strategy formation such as those put forward by Trubowitz (2011), Dueck 
(2006), Narizny (2007) and others, while hopefully providing some clarity on the complex way 
realist and other factors interact. For example, in the case of the United States, detailed analysis 
of the data demonstrates that internal variables work primarily to limit the acceptable strategy 
choices, while specific strategies are then chosen from the acceptable options based on a 
country’s strategic position at the time. This is in many ways similar to Dueck’s “strategic 
culture” (2006), but with different underpinnings. This interaction is then further complicated 
during periods of great societal stress, during which policy may shift from the predicted 
approach for a period of time before snapping back to the predicted approach after several years. 
In addition, the three statistical models also provide some statistical evidence in support of 
democratic peace theory, Jervis’ security dilemma (including the idea of offense - defense 
balance),114 as well as Organski and Kugler’s theory of great power conflict.115 
With respect to future research, it may be time for us as a field to move beyond the realist 
vs. constructivist debate and into one focused on understanding when and where each of these 
factors have their greatest impact. There by beginning the process of translating all the work on 
grand strategy that researchers have spent years of effort accumulating into a comprehensive 
whole with the potential to have a real impact on the challenges we face. With respect to the 
future of this research, it will be important to find ways to expand both the number of countries 
represented in the data, and the time period covered, in order to improve the model’s accuracy 
and generalizability. It is also critical to expand the model beyond Great Power states; of 
                                                          
114 Jervis, Robert. 1986. “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation.” Cooperation 
Under Anarchy. Eds. Kenneth Oye, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. pg. 78 
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particular interest are second rank and regional powers due to the important role they play in 
many of today’s most difficult international relations issues. It is also of utmost importance to 
find some way to capture the effects of societal stress in the model and to develop a theory to 
better explain its interaction with the overall rational model. Finally, future research should 
consider additional independent variables to better represent both the realist as well as the myriad 
constructivist models of grand strategy formation. 
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Appendix: 
 Statistically Significant Model 3 Results Given in table A1 (below). 
 
 Complete Model 3 results given in table A2a – A2b (below). 
 
 
 Complete List of Observed Grand Strategies and Model 3 Predictions given 
in Table A3 (below). 
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Table A1: Model 3; Statistically Significant Effects of Tested Variables on Grand 
Strategy Choice the Following Year 
 
 
Coefficient Z Score P > |z| % Change 
Rel. Expend. Per Personnel     
Legalist vs. Interventionist -1.97 -2.095 0.036 -86.1 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -3.48 -3.697 0.000 -96.9 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 1.97 2.095 0.036 619.1 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 3.48 3.696 0.000 3149.9 
Relative Military Personnel     
Legalist vs. Isolationist -8.77 -3.111 0.002 -100.0 
Legalist vs. Interventionist -3.80 -2.433 0.015 -97.8 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -4.92 -3.145 0.002 -99.3 
Isolationist vs. Legalist 8.77 3.111 0.002 643467.1 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 3.80 2.433 0.015 4369.4 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 4.92 3.061 0.002 13488.7 
Relative Military Expenditure     
Legalist vs. Interventionist 2.62 2.541 0.011 1274.4 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 1.75 1.695 0.090 474.5 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -2.62 -2.541 0.011 -92.7 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -1.75 -1.839 0.066 -82.6 
Homeland Vulnerability     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 10.57 2.779 0.005 3.9x10^6 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 3.52 3.639 0.000 3281.3 
Isolationist vs. Legalist -10.57 -2.779 0.005 -100.0 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist 10.47 -3.224 0.001 -100.0 
Isolationist vs Revisionist -7.05 -2.171 0.030 -99.9 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 10.47 3.224 0.001 3.5x10^6 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -3.52 -3.703 0.000 -97.0 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 7.05 2.183 0.029 115436.3 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist -3.42 -5.938 0.000 -96.7 
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Coefficient Z Score P > |z| % Change 
Relative GDP     
Legalist vs. Revisionist -4.25 -4.801 0.000 -98.6 
Relative GDP Per Capita     
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 5.87 2.097 0.036 35313.8 
Primarily Marxist Economy     
Legalist vs. Revisionist 9.23 2.389 0.017 1.0x10^6 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -9.21 -1.799 0.072 -100.0 
Primarily Mercantilist Economy     
Legalist vs. Interventionist 1.62 1.890 0.059 404.8 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -10.78 -12.579 0.000 -100.0 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -1.62 -1.890 0.059 -80.2 
Presidential Democracy     
Legalist vs. Isolationist -45.47 -3.808 0.000 -100 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 12.49 4.327 0.000 2.7x10^7 
Isolationist vs. Legalist 45.47 3.808 0.000 5.6x10^21 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist 43.46 3.381 0.001 7.5x10^20 
Isolationist vs Revisionist 57.96 4.509 0.000 1.5x10^27 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist -43.46 -3.381 0.001 -100.0 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist -57.96 -5.838 0.000 -100.0 
Parliamentary Democracy     
Legalist vs. Interventionist -5.31 -4.408 0.000 -99.5 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 5.31 4.408 0.000 20139.7 
Dictatorship     
Legalist vs. Revisionist -10.68 -7.004 0.000 -100.0 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 10.68 2.576 0.010 4.4x10^6 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist 9.01 2.182 0.029 819109.0 
Polity 2 Score     
Legalist vs. Revisionist 0.32 2.359 0.018 38.3 
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Notes:      
*Base Government Type was Monarchy, **Base Economic System was Liberal 
 
Data derived from: 
Sarkees, Meredith Reid and Frank Wayman (2010). Resort to War: 1816 - 2007. Washington DC: CQ Press, 
 
Maddison, Angus (2006) The World Economy: Volume 1: A Millennial Perspective and Volume 2 
Historical Statistics. OECD Development Centre, 
Polity Project: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html 
 
    
 
Coefficient Z Score P > |z| % Change 
Nation Age     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 0.2162 1.952 0.051 24.1 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 0.09 7.634 0.000 9.3 
Isolationist vs. Legalist -0.22 -1.95 0.051 -19.4 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist -0.22 -2.073 0.038 -19.9 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 0.22 2.073 0.038 24.8 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 0.13 1.956 0.050 13.6 
Number of Observations 366  
Pseudo R-squared 0.6789  
Pseudo Log Likelihood -145.63  
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Table A2a: Model 3a; Effect of Relative Military Power on Grand Strategy 
Choice the Following Year 
 
 
Coefficient Z Score P > |z| % Change 
Rel. Expend. Per Personnel     
Legalist vs. Isolationist -1.28 -0.465 0.642 -72.2 
Legalist vs. Interventionist -1.97 -2.095 0.036 -86.1 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -3.48 -3.697 0.000 -96.9 
Isolationist vs. Legalist 1.28 0.465 0.642 260.3 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist -0.69 -0.292 0.770 -49.9 
Isolationist vs Revisionist -2.20 -0.930 0.352 -88.9 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 1.97 2.095 0.036 619.1 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 0.69 0.292 0.770 99.6 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 3.48 3.696 0.000 3149.9 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 2.20 0.613 0.540 802.0 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist 1.51 0.900 0.368 352.0 
Relative Military Personnel     
Legalist vs. Isolationist -8.77 -3.111 0.002 -100.0 
Legalist vs. Interventionist -3.80 -2.433 0.015 -97.8 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -4.92 -3.145 0.002 -99.3 
Isolationist vs. Legalist 8.77 3.111 0.002 643467.1 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist 4.97 1.418 0.156 14299.5 
Isolationist vs Revisionist 3.86 1.101 0.271 4636.1 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 3.80 2.433 0.015 4369.4 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist -4.97 -1.418 0.156 -99.3 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 4.92 3.061 0.002 13488.7 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist -3.86 -1.448 0.148 -97.9 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist 1.11 0.543 0.587 204.0 
Relative Military Expenditure     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 0.50 0.262 0.793 64.7 
Legalist vs. Interventionist 2.62 2.541 0.011 1274.4 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 1.75 1.695 0.090 474.5 
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Isolationist vs. Legalist -0.50 -0.262 0.793 -39.3 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist 2.12 1.118 0.263 734.4 
Isolationist vs Revisionist 1.25 0.659 0.510 248.8 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -2.62 -2.541 0.011 -92.7 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist -2.12 -1.118 0.263 -88.0 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -1.75 -1.839 0.066 -82.6 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist -1.25 -0.651 0.515 -71.3 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist 0.87 0.678 0.498 139.2 
Homeland Vulnerability     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 10.57 2.779 0.005 3.9x10^6 
Legalist vs. Interventionist 0.10 0.102 0.919 10.4 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 3.52 3.639 0.000 3281.3 
Isolationist vs. Legalist -10.57 -2.779 0.005 -100.0 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist 10.47 -3.224 0.001 -100.0 
Isolationist vs Revisionist -7.05 -2.171 0.030 -99.9 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -0.10 -0.102 0.919 -9.4 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 10.47 3.224 0.001 3.5x10^6 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -3.52 -3.703 0.000 -97.0 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 7.05 2.183 0.029 115436.3 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist -3.42 -5.938 0.000 -96.7 
     
Number of Observations 366  
Pseudo R-squared 0.6789  
Pseudo Log Likelihood -145.63  
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Table A2b: Model 3b; Effect of Relative Economic Power on Grand Strategy 
Choice the Following Year 
 
 
Coefficient Z Score P > |z| % Change 
Relative GDP     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 11.45 0.786 0.432 9.4x10^6 
Legalist vs. Interventionist 0.98 1.107 0.268 166.4 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -4.25 -4.801 0.000 -98.6 
Isolationist vs. Legalist -11.45 -0.786 0.432 -100.0 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist -10.47 -0.688 0.491 -100.0 
Isolationist vs Revisionist -15.70 -1.032 0.302 -100.0 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -0.98 -1.107 0.268 -62.5 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 10.47 0.688 0.491 3.5x10^6 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 4.25 1.005 0.315 6919.2 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 15.70 1.279 0.201 6.6x10^8 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist 5.23 1.042 0.297 18597.9 
Relative GDP Per Capita     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 7.12 0.943 0.346 124066.0 
Legalist vs. Interventionist 1.20 0.263 0.792 232.0 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 1.25 0.275 0.783 250.6 
Isolationist vs. Legalist -7.12 -0.943 0.346 -99.9 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist -5.92 -1.44 0.150 -99.7 
Isolationist vs Revisionist -5.87 -1.43 0.154 -99.7 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -1.20 -0.263 0.792 -69.9 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 5.92 1.441 0.150 37303.7 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -1.25 -0.199 0.842 -71.5 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 5.87 2.097 0.036 35313.8 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist -0.05 -0.019 0.985 -5.3 
Primarily Marxist Economy     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 20.95 0.978 0.328 1.2x10^11 
Legalist vs. Interventionist 4.49 1.164 0.244 8815.1 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 9.23 2.389 0.017 1.0x10^6 
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Isolationist vs. Legalist -20.94 -0.978 0.328 -100.0 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist -16.45 -0.878 0.380 -100.0 
Isolationist vs Revisionist -11.73 -0.626 0.531 -100.0 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -4.49 -1.164 0.244 -98.9 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 16.45 0.878 0.380 1.4x10^9 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -9.21 -1.799 0.072 -100.0 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 11.73 0.508 0.612 1.2x10^7 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist -4.72 -0.645 0.519 -99.1 
Primarily Mercantilist Economy     
Legalist vs. Isolationist -13.57 -0.915 0.360 -100.0 
Legalist vs. Interventionist 1.62 1.890 0.059 404.8 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -10.78 -12.579 0.000 -100.0 
Isolationist vs. Legalist 13.57 0.915 0.360 7.8x10^7 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist 15.19 1.057 0.290 3.9x10^8 
Isolationist vs Revisionist 2.79 0.194 0.846 1530.0 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -1.62 -1.890 0.059 -80.2 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist -15.19 -1.057 0.290 -100.0 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 10.78 1.211 0.226 4.8x10^6 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist -2.80 -0.143 0.887 -93.9 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist 12.40 1.318 0.188 2.4x10^7 
     
Number of Observations 366  
Pseudo R-squared 0.6789  
Pseudo Log Likelihood -145.63  
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Table A2c: Model 3c; Effect of Government Variables on Grand Strategy Choice 
the Following Year 
 
 
Coefficient Z Score P > |z| % Change 
Presidential Democracy     
Legalist vs. Isolationist -45.47 -3.808 0.000 -100 
Legalist vs. Interventionist -2.01 -0.695 0.487 -86.6 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 12.49 4.327 0.000 2.7x10^7 
Isolationist vs. Legalist 45.47 3.808 0.000 5.6x10^21 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist 43.46 3.381 0.001 7.5x10^20 
Isolationist vs Revisionist 57.96 4.509 0.000 1.5x10^27 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 2.01 0.695 0.487 644.3 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist -43.46 -3.381 0.001 -100.0 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -12.49 -1.599 0.110 -100.0 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist -57.96 -5.838 0.000 -100.0 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist -14.50 -1.601 0.109 -100.0 
Parliamentary Democracy     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 1.68 0.081 0.935 436.9 
Legalist vs. Interventionist -5.31 -4.408 0.000 -99.5 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -0.79 -0.653 0.514 -54.5 
Isolationist vs. Legalist -1.68 -0.081 0.935 -81.4 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist -6.99 -0.333 0.739 -99.9 
Isolationist vs Revisionist -2.47 -0.117 0.907 -91.5 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 5.31 4.408 0.000 20139.7 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 6.99 0.333 0.739 108568.9 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 0.79 0.228 0.820 119.6 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 2.47 0.133 0.895 1078.9 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist -4.52 -1.177 0.239 -98.9 
Dictatorship     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 22.56 0.892 0.372 6.3x10^11 
Legalist vs. Interventionist -1.67 -1.097 0.272 -81.2 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -10.68 -7.004 0.000 -100.0 
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Isolationist vs. Legalist -22.56 -0.892 0.372 -100.0 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist -24.23 -0.968 0.333 -100.0 
Isolationist vs Revisionist -33.24 -1.328 0.184 -100.0 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 1.67 1.097 0.272 433.3 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 24.23 0.968 0.333 3.3x10^12 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 10.68 2.576 0.010 4.4x10^6 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 33.24 1.397 0.163 2.7x10^16 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist 9.01 2.182 0.029 819109.0 
Polity 2 Score     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 2.13 0.887 0.375 743.4 
Legalist vs. Interventionist 0.03 0.202 0.840 2.8 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 0.32 2.359 0.018 38.3 
Isolationist vs. Legalist -2.13 -0.887 0.375 -88.1 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist -2.10 -0.874 0.382 -87.8 
Isolationist vs Revisionist -1.81 -0.751 0.453 -83.6 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -0.03 -0.202 0.840 -2.7 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 2.10 0.874 0.382 720.3 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -0.32 -0.687 0.492 -27.7 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 1.81 0.848 0.397 510.0 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist -0.30 -0.604 0.546 -25.6 
     
Number of Observations 366  
Pseudo R-squared 0.6789  
Pseudo Log Likelihood -145.63  
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Table A2d: Model 3d; Effect of Other Variables on Grand Strategy Choice the 
Following Year 
 
 
Coefficient Z Score P > |z| % Change 
Nation Age     
Legalist vs. Isolationist 0.2162 1.952 0.051 24.1 
Legalist vs. Interventionist -0.01 -0.476 0.634 -0.6 
Legalist vs. Revisionist 0.09 7.634 0.000 9.3 
Isolationist vs. Legalist -0.22 -1.95 0.051 -19.4 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist -0.22 -2.073 0.038 -19.9 
Isolationist vs Revisionist -0.13 -1.189 0.235 -11.9 
Interventionist vs. Legalist 0.01 0.476 0.634 0.6 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist 0.22 2.073 0.038 24.8 
Revisionist vs. Legalist -0.09 -1.155 0.248 -8.5 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist 0.13 1.956 0.050 13.6 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist -0.09 -1.277 0.202 -9.0 
Years Since Last Major War     
Legalist vs. Isolationist -0.05 -0.494 0.621 -4.7 
Legalist vs. Interventionist 0.01 0.274 0.784 0.9 
Legalist vs. Revisionist -0.03 -0.845 0.398 -2.6 
Isolationist vs. Legalist 0.05 0.494 0.621 4.9 
Isolationist vs. Interventionist 0.06 0.725 0.469 5.8 
Isolationist vs Revisionist 0.02 0.275 0.784 2.2 
Interventionist vs. Legalist -0.01 -0.274 0.784 -0.9 
Interventionist vs. Isolationist -0.06 -0.725 0.469 -5.5 
Revisionist vs. Legalist 0.03 1.325 0.185 2.7 
Revisionist vs. Isolationist -0.02 -0.220 0.826 -2.1 
Revisionist vs. Interventionist 0.03 0.791 0.429 3.6 
     
Number of Observations 366  
Pseudo R-squared 0.6789  
Pseudo Log Likelihood -145.63  
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Table A3 
State 
Abb. Year Administration Observed Grand Strategy 
Model 3 Predicted 
Strategy 
AUH 1892 Francis Joseph I Legalist  
AUH 1893 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1894 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1895 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1896 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1897 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1898 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1899 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1900 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1901 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1902 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1903 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1904 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1905 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1906 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1907 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1908 Francis Joseph I Revisionist Legalist 
AUH 1909 Francis Joseph I Isolationist Legalist 
AUH 1910 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1911 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1912 Francis Joseph I Legalist Legalist 
AUH 1913 Francis Joseph I Interventionist Legalist 
AUH 1914 Francis Joseph I Interventionist Legalist 
AUH 1915 Francis Joseph I Interventionist  
AUH 1916 Francis Joseph I Interventionist Interventionist 
AUH 1917 Charles I Interventionist Interventionist 
AUH 1918 Charles I Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1892 Marie Francois Sadi Carnot Interventionist  
FRN 1893 Marie Francois Sadi Carnot Interventionist Revisionist 
FRN 1894 Jean Casimir-Perier Interventionist  
FRN 1895 Felix Faure Revisionist Revisionist 
FRN 1896 Felix Faure Revisionist Interventionist 
FRN 1897 Felix Faure Revisionist Interventionist 
FRN 1898 Felix Faure Revisionist Interventionist 
FRN 1899 Emile Loubet Revisionist Interventionist 
FRN 1900 Emile Loubet Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1901 Emile Loubet Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1902 Emile Loubet Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1903 Emile Loubet Interventionist Interventionist 
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FRN 1904 Emile Loubet Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1905 Emile Loubet Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1906 Armand Fllieres Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1907 Armand Fllieres Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1908 Armand Fllieres Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1909 Armand Fllieres Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1910 Armand Fllieres Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1911 Armand Fllieres Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1912 Armand Fllieres Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1913 Raymond Poincare Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1914 Raymond Poincare Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1915 Raymond Poincare Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1916 Raymond Poincare Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1917 Raymond Poincare Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1918 Raymond Poincare Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1919 Raymond Poincare Revisionist Interventionist 
FRN 1920 Paul Deschanel Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1921 Alexandre Millerand Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1922 Alexandre Millerand Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1923 Alexandre Millerand Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1924 Gaston Doumergue Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1925 Gaston Doumergue Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1926 Gaston Doumergue Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1927 Gaston Doumergue Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1928 Gaston Doumergue Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1929 Gaston Doumergue Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1930 Gaston Doumergue Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1931 Paul Doumer Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1932 Albert Lebrun Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1933 Albert Lebrun Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1934 Albert Lebrun Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1935 Albert Lebrun Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1936 Albert Lebrun Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1937 Albert Lebrun Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1938 Albert Lebrun Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1939 Albert Lebrun Interventionist Interventionist 
FRN 1940 Albert Lebrun Interventionist Interventionist 
GMY(I) 1892 Wilhelm II Legalist  
GMY(I) 1893 Wilhelm II Legalist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1894 Wilhelm II Legalist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1895 Wilhelm II Legalist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1896 Wilhelm II Legalist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1897 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
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GMY(I) 1898 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1899 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1900 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1901 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1902 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1903 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1904 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1905 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1906 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1907 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1908 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1909 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1910 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1911 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1912 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1913 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1914 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1915 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1916 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(I) 1917 Wilhelm II Revisionist  
GMY(I) 1918 Wilhelm II Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(N) 1935 Adolf Hitler Revisionist  
GMY(N) 1936 Adolf Hitler Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(N) 1937 Adolf Hitler Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(N) 1938 Adolf Hitler Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(N) 1939 Adolf Hitler Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(N) 1940 Adolf Hitler Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(N) 1941 Adolf Hitler Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(N) 1942 Adolf Hitler Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(N) 1943 Adolf Hitler Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(N) 1944 Adolf Hitler Revisionist Revisionist 
GMY(N) 1945 Adolf Hitler Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1905 Katsura Taro Revisionist  
JPN 1906 Saionji Kinmochi Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1907 Saionji Kinmochi Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1908 Saionji Kinmochi Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1909 Katsura Taro Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1910 Katsura Taro Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1911 Katsura Taro Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1912 Saionji Kinmochi Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1913 Yamamoto Gonnohyoe Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1914 Okuma Shigenobu Revisionist Isolationist 
JPN 1915 Okuma Shigenobu Revisionist Isolationist 
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JPN 1916 Okuma Shigenobu Revisionist Isolationist 
JPN 1917 Terauchi Masatake Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1918 Terauchi Masatake Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1919 Hara Takashi Isolationist Revisionist 
JPN 1920 Hara Takashi Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1921 Hara Takashi Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1922 Takahashi Korekiyo Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1923 Kato Tomosaburo Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1924 Kato Takaaki Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1925 Kato Takaaki Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1926 Wakatsuki Reijiro Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1927 Tanaka Giichi Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1928 Tanaka Giichi Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1929 Tanaka Giichi Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1930 Osachi Hamaguchi Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1931 Wakatsuki Reijiro Revisionist Isolationist 
JPN 1932 Saito Makoto Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1933 Saito Makoto Isolationist Isolationist 
JPN 1934 Keisuki Okada Isolationist Revisionist 
JPN 1935 Keisuki Okada Isolationist Revisionist 
JPN 1936 Koki Hirota Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1937 Fumimaro Konoe Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1938 Fumimaro Konoe Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1939 Hiranuma Kiichiro Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1940 Mitsumasa Yonai Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1941 Fumimaro Konoe Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1942 Hideki Tojo Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1943 Hideki Tojo Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1944 Hideki Tojo Revisionist Revisionist 
JPN 1945 Kuniaki Koiso Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(I) 1892 Alexander III Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1893 Alexander III Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1894 Alexander III Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1895 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1896 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1897 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1898 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1899 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1900 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1901 Nicholas II Interventionist Interventionist 
RUS(I) 1902 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1903 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1904 Nicholas II Interventionist  
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RUS(I) 1905 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1906 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1907 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1908 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1909 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1910 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1911 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1912 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1913 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1914 Nicholas II Interventionist Interventionist 
RUS(I) 1915 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1916 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(I) 1917 Nicholas II Interventionist  
RUS(S) 1922 Vladimir Lenin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1923 Vladimir Lenin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1924 Joseph Stalin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1925 Joseph Stalin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1926 Joseph Stalin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1927 Joseph Stalin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1928 Joseph Stalin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1929 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1930 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1931 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1932 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1933 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1934 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1935 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1936 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1937 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1938 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1939 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1940 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1941 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1942 Joseph Stalin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1943 Joseph Stalin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1944 Joseph Stalin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1945 Joseph Stalin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1946 Joseph Stalin Revisionist  
RUS(S) 1947 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1948 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1949 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1950 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1951 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
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RUS(S) 1952 Joseph Stalin Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1953 Georgy Malenkov Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1954 Georgy Malenkov Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1955 Nikita Khruschev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1956 Nikita Khruschev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1957 Nikita Khruschev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1958 Nikita Khruschev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1959 Nikita Khruschev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1960 Nikita Khruschev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1961 Nikita Khruschev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1962 Nikita Khruschev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1963 Nikita Khruschev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1964 Nikita Khruschev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1965 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1966 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1967 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1968 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1969 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1970 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1971 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1972 Leonid Brezhnev Interventionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1973 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1974 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1975 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1976 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1977 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1978 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1979 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1980 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1981 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1982 Leonid Brezhnev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1983 Yuri Andropov Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1984 Konstantin Chernenko Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1986 Mikhail Gorbachev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev Revisionist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev Legalist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1989 Mikhail Gorbachev Legalist Revisionist 
RUS(S) 1990 Mikhail Gorbachev Legalist  
RUS(S) 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev Interventionist Legalist 
UKG 1892 William Gladstone Interventionist  
UKG 1893 William Gladstone Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1894 Archibald Primrose Interventionist Interventionist 
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UKG 1895 Archibald Primrose Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1896 Robert Gascoyne-Cecil Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1897 Robert Gascoyne-Cecil Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1898 Robert Gascoyne-Cecil Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1899 Robert Gascoyne-Cecil Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1900 Robert Gascoyne-Cecil Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1901 Robert Gascoyne-Cecil Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1902 Robert Gascoyne-Cecil Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1903 Arthor Balfour Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1904 Arthor Balfour Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1905 Arthor Balfour Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1906 Henry Campbell-Bannerman Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1907 Henry Campbell-Bannerman Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1908 Herbert Asquith Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1909 Herbert Asquith Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1910 Herbert Asquith Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1911 Herbert Asquith Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1912 Herbert Asquith Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1913 Herbert Asquith Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1914 Herbert Asquith Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1915 Herbert Asquith Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1916 Herbert Asquith Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1917 Loyd George Interventionist  
UKG 1918 Loyd George Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1919 Loyd George Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1920 Loyd George Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1921 Loyd George Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1922 Loyd George Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1923 Stanley Baldwin Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1924 Ramsay MacDonald Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1925 Stanley Baldwin Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1926 Stanley Baldwin Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1927 Stanley Baldwin Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1928 Stanley Baldwin Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1929 Ramsay MacDonald Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1930 Ramsay MacDonald Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1931 Ramsay MacDonald Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1932 Ramsay MacDonald Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1933 Ramsay MacDonald Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1934 Ramsay MacDonald Legalist Interventionist 
UKG 1935 Stanley Baldwin Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1936 Stanley Baldwin Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1937 Neville Chamberlain Interventionist Interventionist 
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UKG 1938 Neville Chamberlain Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1939 Neville Chamberlain Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1940 Winston Churchill Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1941 Winston Churchill Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1942 Winston Churchill Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1943 Winston Churchill Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1944 Winston Churchill Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1945 Winston Churchill Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1946 Clement Attlee Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1947 Clement Attlee Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1948 Clement Attlee Interventionist Interventionist 
UKG 1949 Clement Attlee Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1892 Benjamin Harrison Isolationist  
USA 1893 Grover Clevland Isolationist Isolationist 
USA 1894 Grover Clevland Isolationist Isolationist 
USA 1895 Grover Clevland Isolationist Isolationist 
USA 1896 Grover Clevland Isolationist Isolationist 
USA 1897 William McKinley Isolationist Isolationist 
USA 1898 William McKinley Revisionist Isolationist 
USA 1899 William McKinley Isolationist Isolationist 
USA 1900 William McKinley Isolationist Isolationist 
USA 1901 William McKinley Isolationist  
USA 1902 Theodore Roosevelt Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1903 Theodore Roosevelt Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1904 Theodore Roosevelt Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1905 Theodore Roosevelt Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1906 Theodore Roosevelt Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1907 Theodore Roosevelt Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1908 Theodore Roosevelt Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1909 William H. Taft Legalist Interventionist 
USA 1910 William H. Taft Legalist  
USA 1911 William H. Taft Legalist  
USA 1912 William H. Taft Legalist  
USA 1913 Woodrow Wilson Legalist  
USA 1914 Woodrow Wilson Legalist  
USA 1915 Woodrow Wilson Legalist Legalist 
USA 1916 Woodrow Wilson Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1917 Woodrow Wilson Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1918 Woodrow Wilson Interventionist Legalist 
USA 1919 Woodrow Wilson Legalist Legalist 
USA 1920 Woodrow Wilson Legalist Legalist 
USA 1921 Warren G. Harding Legalist Legalist 
USA 1922 Warren G. Harding Legalist Legalist 
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USA 1923 Warren G. Harding Legalist Legalist 
USA 1924 Calvin Coolidge Legalist Legalist 
USA 1925 Calvin Coolidge Legalist Legalist 
USA 1926 Calvin Coolidge Legalist Legalist 
USA 1927 Calvin Coolidge Legalist Legalist 
USA 1928 Calvin Coolidge Legalist Legalist 
USA 1929 Herbert Hoover Legalist Legalist 
USA 1930 Herbert Hoover Legalist Legalist 
USA 1931 Herbert Hoover Legalist Legalist 
USA 1932 Herbert Hoover Legalist Legalist 
USA 1933 Franklin D. Roosevelt Legalist Legalist 
USA 1934 Franklin D. Roosevelt Legalist Legalist 
USA 1935 Franklin D. Roosevelt Legalist Legalist 
USA 1936 Franklin D. Roosevelt Legalist Legalist 
USA 1937 Franklin D. Roosevelt Interventionist Legalist 
USA 1938 Franklin D. Roosevelt Interventionist Legalist 
USA 1939 Franklin D. Roosevelt Legalist Legalist 
USA 1940 Franklin D. Roosevelt Interventionist Legalist 
USA 1941 Franklin D. Roosevelt Interventionist Legalist 
USA 1942 Franklin D. Roosevelt Interventionist Legalist 
USA 1943 Franklin D. Roosevelt Interventionist Legalist 
USA 1944 Franklin D. Roosevelt Interventionist Legalist 
USA 1945 Harry S. Truman Interventionist Legalist 
USA 1946 Harry S. Truman Legalist Legalist 
USA 1947 Harry S. Truman Legalist Interventionist 
USA 1948 Harry S. Truman Legalist Interventionist 
USA 1949 Harry S. Truman Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1950 Harry S. Truman Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1951 Harry S. Truman Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1952 Harry S. Truman Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1953 Dwight D. Eisenhower Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1954 Dwight D. Eisenhower Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1955 Dwight D. Eisenhower Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1956 Dwight D. Eisenhower Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1957 Dwight D. Eisenhower Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1958 Dwight D. Eisenhower Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1959 Dwight D. Eisenhower Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1960 Dwight D. Eisenhower Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1961 John F Kennedy Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1962 John F Kennedy Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1963 John F Kennedy Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1964 Lyndon B. Johnson Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1965 Lyndon B. Johnson Interventionist Interventionist 
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USA 1966 Lyndon B. Johnson Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1967 Lyndon B. Johnson Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1968 Lyndon B. Johnson Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1969 Richard M. Nixon Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1970 Richard M. Nixon Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1971 Richard M. Nixon Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1972 Richard M. Nixon Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1973 Richard M. Nixon Legalist Interventionist 
USA 1974 Richard M. Nixon Legalist Interventionist 
USA 1975 Gerald R. Ford Legalist Interventionist 
USA 1976 Gerald R. Ford Legalist Interventionist 
USA 1977 Jimmy Carter Legalist Interventionist 
USA 1978 Jimmy Carter Legalist Interventionist 
USA 1979 Jimmy Carter Legalist Interventionist 
USA 1980 Jimmy Carter Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1981 Ronald Reagan Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1982 Ronald Reagan Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1983 Ronald Reagan Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1984 Ronald Reagan Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1985 Ronald Reagan Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1986 Ronald Reagan Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1987 Ronald Reagan Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1988 Ronald Reagan Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1989 George Bush Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1990 George Bush Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1991 George Bush Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1992 George Bush Interventionist Interventionist 
USA 1993 Bill Clinton Interventionist  
USA 1994 Bill Clinton Interventionist  
USA 1995 Bill Clinton Interventionist  
USA 1996 Bill Clinton Interventionist  
USA 1997 Bill Clinton Interventionist  
USA 1998 Bill Clinton Interventionist  
USA 1999 Bill Clinton Interventionist  
USA 2000 Bill Clinton Interventionist  
USA 2001 George W. Bush Interventionist  
USA 2002 George W. Bush Interventionist  
USA 2003 George W. Bush Interventionist  
USA 2004 George W. Bush Interventionist  
USA 2005 George W. Bush Interventionist  
USA 2006 George W. Bush Interventionist  
USA 2007 George W. Bush Interventionist  
USA 2008 George W. Bush Interventionist  
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USA 2009 Barack Obama Interventionist  
USA 2010 Barack Obama Interventionist  
USA 2011 Barack Obama Interventionist  
USA 2012 Barack Obama Interventionist  
 
